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Which Industrial Policy Does Europe Need?
One lesson of the Great Recession has been that countries with higher shares of industry in their 
GDP seemed to be less affected by the crisis. Consequently, the call for an industrial renaissance 
has become stronger. Industrial policy has now become a top priority in countries where it was 
not explicitly considered in the past. A strong EU-wide industrial policy is expected to foster 
growth and job creation. However, cultivating industrial development is a complex challenge. 
This Forum addresses the steps that need to be taken to create a new European industrial policy. 
What are the structural challenges that need to be addressed? What are the instruments of the 
EU’s industrial policy? And should the EU be engaged in picking winners, or is the market better 
at making such judgements?
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Innovation Systems: From Fixing Market Failures to Creating  
Markets
The important thing for Government is not to do things 
which individuals are doing already, and to do them 
a little better or a little worse; but to do those things 
which at present are not done at all. – John M. Keynes1
The road to the free market was opened and kept open 
by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally or-
ganized and controlled interventionism. – Karl Polanyi2
Instead of asking: what benefits [has] this project yield-
ed, it would almost be more pertinent to ask: how many 
conflicts has it brought in its wake? How many crises 
has it occasioned and passed through? And these 
conflicts and crises should appear both on the benefit 
and the cost side, or sometimes on one—sometimes 
on the other, depending on the outcome (which cannot 
be known with precision for a long time, if ever). – Al-
fred O. Hirschman3
* This article is an edited (shortened and translated into English) version 
of M. Mazzuca t o : Costruire lo Stato innovatore: un nuovo quadro 
per la previsione e la valutazione di politiche economiche che creano 
(non solo aggiustano) il mercato, in: Lo Stato innovatore: una discus-
sione, in: Economia & Lavoro, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2014, pp. 7-24.
1 J.M. Keynes : The end of laissez-faire, London 1926, Prometheus 
Books.
2 K. Po l any i : The great transformation: the political and economic ori-
gins of our time, New York 1944, Farrar & Rinehart.
3 Cited in J. Ade lman : Worldly philosopher: the odyssey of Albert O. 
Hirschman, Princeton 2013, Princeton University Press, p. 313.
Today countries around the world are seeking “smart”, in-
novation-led growth – and hoping that this growth is also 
more “inclusive” and “sustainable” than in the past.4 Such 
a feat requires rethinking the role of government and pub-
lic policy in the economy – funding not only the “rate” of 
innovation, but also envisioning its direction. It requires a 
new justification of government intervention that goes be-
yond the usual one of “fixing market failures”. It requires 
the shaping and creating of markets. Rendering such 
growth more inclusive requires attention to the ensuing 
distribution of risks and rewards.
Complexity theory is relevant here because innovation is 
(1) a collective process, defined by a system of hetero-
geneous public and private actors, interacting in different 
ways; (2) it is a fundamentally uncertain process (in the 
Knightian sense), with most attempts ending in failure; 
and (3) it is a path-dependent, cumulative and highly clus-
tered (wave-like) process, characterised by fat-tailed dis-
tributions. Unfortunately, models of innovation continue 
to pretend the opposite, i.e. that (1) it is driven mainly by 
the individual genius of entrepreneurs, at best facilitated 
by the public sector; (2) only characterised by risk (see the 
lottery models of endogenous growth theory); and (3) can 
be modelled as a random walk (with little persistence) that 
4 European Commission: Europe 2020: A European strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, 2010.
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statistically appears as a Gaussian process. Understand-
ing the collective, uncertain and persistent nature of inno-
vation helps us to understand the kind of policy questions 
that we should be asking if we want to achieve smart, 
innovation-led growth.
Limitations to market failure theory
Market failure theory justifies public intervention in the 
economy only if it is geared towards fixing situations in 
which markets fail to efficiently allocate resources.5 The 
market failure approach suggests that governments in-
tervene to “fix” markets by investing in areas with “pub-
lic goods” characteristics (such as basic research or 
drugs with little market potential) and by devising market 
mechanisms to internalise external costs (such as pollu-
tion) or external benefits (such as herd immunity). Five key 
sources of market failures – that is, factors or behaviours 
that result in costs or benefits that are not reflected in the 
price system – include imperfect competition, information 
failures, negative externalities, public goods and coordi-
nation failures.6
Within the mainstream framework, market failure is a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for governmental in-
tervention.7 The sufficiency results from an assessment 
that the gains from intervention outweigh the associated 
costs of governmental failures8 – such as capture by 
private interests (nepotism, cronyism, corruption, rent-
seeking),9 misallocation of resources (for example, “pick-
ing losers”),10 or undue competition with private initiatives 
(crowding out)11. Thus, there is a trade-off between two 
inefficient outcomes; one is generated by free markets 
(market failure) and the other by governmental interven-
tion (government failure). The solutions advocated by neo-
Keynesians focus on correcting failures such as imper-
5 K. A r row : An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare 
economics. Paper presented at the Second Berkeley Symposium on 
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Berkeley 1951.
6 M. Mazzuca t o , C. Penna : Beyond market failures: the market cre-
ating and shaping role of state investment banks, University of Sus-
sex, SPRU working paper SWPS 2014-21, 2014.
7 C. Wo l f : Markets or governments: choosing between imperfect alter-
natives, Cambridge MA 1988, MIT Press.
8 G. Tu l l o ck , A. Se l don , G.L. B r ady : Government failure: a primer 
in public choice, Washington DC 2002, Cato Institute.
9 A.O. K r uege r : The political economy of the rent-seeking society, in: 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, 1974, pp. 291-303.
10 O. Fa l c k , C. Go l l i e r, L. Woessmann : Arguments for and against 
Policies to Promote National Champions, in: O. F a l c k , C. Go l l i e r, L. 
Woessmann  (eds.): Industrial Policy for National Champions, Cam-
bridge MA 2011, MIT Press, pp. 3-9.
11 B.M. F r i edman : Crowding out or crowding in? The economic con-
sequences of financing government deficits, in: Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1978, pp. 593-654.
fect information.12 Solutions advocated by public choice 
scholars focus on leaving resource allocation to markets 
(which may be able to correct their failures on their own).13 
While market failure theory provides interesting insights, it 
is at best useful for describing a steady state scenario in 
which public policy aims to put patches on existing trajec-
tories provided by markets. It is less useful when policy is 
needed to dynamically create and shape new markets, as 
in the cases of the Internet, nanotech, biotech and clean-
tech. There are four key limitations to the market failure 
theory.
Directionality: envisioning and “picking” strategically
Policies that aim to correct markets assume that once the 
sources of the failure have been addressed, market forc-
es will efficiently direct the economy to a path of growth 
and development. Yet markets are “blind”, and the direc-
tion of change which they provide often represents sub-
12 J. S t i g l i t z , A. We i s s : Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 71, 1981, 
pp. 393-410.
13 J. Buchanan : Public choice: the origins and development of a re-
search program, in: Champions of Freedom, Vol. 31, 2003.
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optimal outcomes from a societal point of view.14 This is 
why, in addressing societal challenges, states have had 
to lead the process and provide the direction towards 
new “techno-economic paradigms”, which do not come 
about spontaneously out of market forces.15 In the mass 
production revolution and the IT revolution, governments 
made direct “mission-oriented” investments in the tech-
nologies that enabled these revolutions to emerge and 
formulated bold policies that allowed them to be fully de-
ployed throughout the economy.16 As I show in my recent 
book, every technology that makes the iPhone “smart” 
(i.e. Internet, GPS, touch-screen display and Siri) was 
publicly funded directly.17 Even the deployment of most 
general purpose technologies, from electricity to IT, was 
an outcome of public policy.18
Furthermore, in the IT revolution, and even in the emerg-
ing clean-tech revolution, government not only funded the 
actual technologies (such as mainframes, the Internet, 
wind and solar power, and fuel cells), but also created a 
network of decentralised public and private actors (a “de-
velopmental network state”),19 provided early-stage fund-
ing to companies that risk-averse private finance would 
not, and devised special tax credits that favoured some 
activities over others.20 These facts seem to point to a dif-
ferent analytical problem facing policy makers: not trying 
to determine whether the right role for government is to 
intervene or to stand back, but rather understanding how 
particular directions and routes can be chosen and de-
termining how to mobilise and manage activities that can 
lead to the achievement of dynamic social and techno-
logical challenges.
Evaluation: static vs. dynamic metrics
Market failure theory has developed concrete indica-
tors and methods to evaluate government investments, 
usually through a cost-benefit analysis that estimates 
14 R.R. Ne l son , S.G. W i n t e r : An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change, Cambridge MA 1982, Belknap Press; G. Dos i : Technologi-
cal paradigms and technological trajectories: a suggested interpreta-
tion of the determinants and directions of technical change, in: Re-
search Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1982, pp. 147-162.
15 C. Pe re z : Technological revolutions and financial capital: the dynam-
ics of bubbles and golden ages, Cheltenham UK 2002, Edgar Elgar.
16 D.C. Mowe r y : Military R&D and innovation, in: B.H. Ha l l , N. 
Rosenbe rg  (eds.): Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, 
Vol. 2, 2010, pp. 1219-1256; F. B l ock , M. Ke l l e r : State of innovation: 
the U.S. government’s role in technology development, Boulder 2011, 
Paradigm.
17 M. Mazzuca t o : The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking the Public vs. 
Private Myth in Risk and Innovation, London 2013, Anthem.
18 C. Pe re z , op. cit.
19 F. B l ock , M. Ke l l e r, op. cit.
20 M. Mazzuca t o : The Entrepreneurial State … , op. cit.; M. Mazzu -
ca t o : Financing innovation: Creative destruction vs. destructive cre-
ation, in: Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 851-867.
whether the benefits of public intervention compensate 
for the costs associated both with the market failure and 
the implementation of the policy (including “governmen-
tal failures”). However, there is a mismatch between the 
intrinsically dynamic character of economic development 
and the static tools used to evaluate policy. The diagnos-
tic tools and evaluation approach based on market fail-
ure theory involve identifying the sources of market failure 
and targeting policy interventions towards their correc-
tion. This entails ex ante considerations about adminis-
trative and fiscal requirements and the political-economic 
consequences of intervention.
Yet this is a limited toolbox, because it represents a static 
evaluation of an intrinsically dynamic process. By not al-
lowing for the possibility that government can transform 
and create new landscapes that did not exist before, the 
ability to measure such impact has been affected.21 This 
then leads to accusations of government “crowding out” 
businesses. However, the goal of public investments 
should be not only to “kick-start” the economy but to 
choose directions that “do those things which at present 
are not done at all”.22 We need indicators for such trans-
formative action, in order to avoid investments that are 
too narrow or directed within the confines of the bounda-
ries set by business practices of the prevailing techno-
economic paradigm.23
Organisation: learning, experimentation and  
self-discovery
Market failure theory calls for the state to intervene as 
little as possible in the economy. This view has resulted 
in a trend of “outsourcing” that often rids government 
of the knowledge capabilities (for example, with regard 
to IT) that are necessary for managing change. Studies 
have examined the influence of outsourcing on the abil-
ity of public institutions to attract top-level talent with the 
relevant knowledge and skills to manage transformative 
mission-oriented policies.24 Indeed, there seems to be 
a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the less “big thinking” 
that occurs in government, the less talent and expertise 
the public sector is able to attract, the less well it per-
forms, the less “big thinking” it is allowed to do. In order 
to promote transformation of the economy by shaping 
and creating technologies, sectors and markets, the state 
21 M. Mazzuca t o : The Entrepreneurial State … , op. cit.
22 J.M. Keynes , op. cit.
23 J. Ab r aham : Pharmaceuticalization of society in context: theoreti-
cal, empirical and health dimensions, in: Sociology, Vol. 44, No. 4, 
2010, pp. 603-622.
24 A. Kakabadse , N. Kakabadse : Trends in Outsourcing: Contrast-
ing USA and Europe, in: European Management Journal, Vol. 20, 
No. 2, 2002, pp. 189-198.
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must organise itself so that it has the “intelligence” (policy 
capacity) to think big and formulate bold policies. This 
does not mean it will always succeed; indeed the underly-
ing uncertainty in the innovation process means that the 
state will often fail.25 If the emphasis is on the process of 
policy making that can allow the public sector to envision 
and manage transformational change,26 then understand-
ing the appropriate structures of public organisations and 
their “absorptive capacity” is essential.27
Risks and rewards: towards symbiotic public-private 
partnerships
Market failure theory says little about cases in which the 
state is the lead investor and risk taker in capitalist econo-
mies through mission-oriented investments and policies.28 
Having a vision of which direction to steer an economy re-
quires direct and indirect investment in particular areas, 
not just creating the conditions for change. This requires 
crucial choices to be made, the fruits of which will create 
some winners but also many losers. Figure 1 shows how 
much public money has been spent on early-stage seed 
financing through the US Small Business Innovation Re-
search programme. Indeed, precisely because venture 
capital has become increasingly short-termist, with em-
phasis on an exit in three years (while innovation generally 
takes 15-20 years!), such funding has become increasingly 
important. Guaranteed loans for innovative high-risk pro-
jects have become similarly important. For example, the 
Obama administration in the US recently provided direct 
loans worth approximately $500 million each to two green-
tech companies, Solyndra and Tesla Motors. While the lat-
ter is often glorified as a success story, the former failed 
miserably and became the latest example, used widely by 
both economists and the more popular treatment in the 
media, of government being unable to “pick winners”. In-
deed, taxpayers had to pick up the bill and vocally com-
plained.29 This highlights the need to build a theoretical 
framework that can help the public sector understand its 
“portfolio” choices30 as well as how to socialise not only 
the risks of those investments but also the rewards. Is it 
right that the taxpayer shouldered the Solyndra loss, yet 
made nothing from the Tesla profits?
25 R.R. Ne l son , S.G. W i n t e r, op. cit.; A.O. H i r s chman : Develop-
ment Projects Observed, 1967, Brookings Institution Press.
26 D. Rod r i k : Green Industrial Policy, Princeton University Working Pa-
per, 2013.
27 W.M. Cohen , D.A. L e v i n t ha l : Absorptive capacity: a new perspec-
tive on learning and innovation, in: Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 35, No. 1, 1990.
28 D. Fo r a y, D. Mowe r y, R.R. Ne l son : Public R&D and social chal-
lenges: What lessons from mission R&D programs?, in: Research 
Policy, Vol. 41, No. 10, 2012, pp. 1697-1902.
29 R. Wood : Fallen Solyndra Won Bankruptcy Battle but Faces Tax War, 
Forbes, 11 June 2012.
30 D. Rod r i k , op. cit.
The question comes down to whether, in a market failure 
framework, the government deserves to retain a direct 
share of the profits generated from the growth that it fos-
ters. Or put another way, are taxes currently bringing back 
enough return to government budgets to fund high-risk 
investments that will probably fail? It is well known that 
companies that benefit greatly from government invest-
ments have been successful in avoiding paying taxes: 
Google, whose algorithm was funded by the NSF, has 
been criticised for such avoidance, as have Apple, Ama-
zon and a host of “new economy” companies. Even if they 
were not dodging taxes, tax rates, such as those on capi-
tal gains, have been falling due to the mainstream accept-
ance of the narrative that a narrow set of agents are the 
real innovators and risk takers.31
31 See W. La zon i c k , M. Mazzuca t o : The Risk-Reward Nexus in the 
Innovation-Inequality Relationship: Who Takes the Risks? Who Gets 
the Rewards?, in: Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 22, No. 4, 
2013, pp. 1093-1128. It was the National Venture Capital Association 
that in the late 1970s lobbied for a reduction in the capital gains tax 
from 39.6 per cent to 20 per cent in five years. Warren Buffett has ad-
mitted that such tax changes did not affect investment, only inequal-
ity.
Figure 1
Number of early-stage and seed funding awards in 
the US
No te : Funding via the governmental Small Business Innovation Re-
search and Small Business Technology Transfer programmes as well as 
from private venture capital.
Sou rce : Adapted from M.R. Ke l l e r, F. B l ock : Explaining the transfor-
mation in the US innovation system: the impact of a small government 
program, in: Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2013, pp. 629-656.
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Socialising both risks and rewards
Innovation is a highly uncertain process; it takes a very 
long time to develop new technologies, and the effort 
often ends up in a dry hole. For every Tesla (companies 
that receive public funding and become market darlings), 
there are many Solyndras (companies that receive public 
funding and then go bankrupt). For every Internet (tech-
nologies funded by government with great success), 
there are many Concordes (projects funded by govern-
ment that fail commercially). Indeed, Solyndra’s recent 
bankruptcy has been used to talk about government 
failure, not recognising that if government is to act like 
a venture capitalist (VC), which it historically has, it will 
undergo many failures to reach some successes – just 
like all VCs must.
However, what has not been sufficiently thought through 
is the way in which to measure success or failure from a 
government’s standpoint, and also how to ensure that, 
like private VC funds, the state can reap some return from 
its successes, in order to cover its losses as well as the 
next round of investments (i.e. a revolving fund). This is 
especially important given the path-dependent and cu-
mulative nature of innovation. Returns arise slowly, re-
maining negative in the beginning before slowly building 
up – potentially to a big pot (e.g. at the end of the biotech, 
dotcom and nanotech revolutions). One can think of re-
turns as a cumulative distribution curve, with a slow rise 
at first, then a steep increase, followed by levelling off. 
Unless we understand the collective process of innova-
tion, we risk allowing a narrow group of actors to reap not 
just the returns proportional to their marginal contribu-
tions, but close to the entire integral under the curve.
So who gets what? Economists argue that the state al-
ready earns a return for its investments, indirectly via the 
taxation system. There are four arguments against this 
reasoning. First, tax evasion (legal and illegal) is common 
and realistically will not disappear. Second, taxes, such 
as capital gains, have been falling over the last few dec-
ades, precisely through a false narrative about who the 
wealth creators are. Third, global movements of capital 
mean that the particular country or region (e.g. the Eu-
ropean Union) funding the innovation might not reap the 
benefits in terms of local job creation. Fourth, while it is 
of course right to think that investments in the “basics”, 
such as education, health and research, should not be 
thought about as earning a return, it is these directed in-
vestments at companies and particular technologies that 
pose a very different problem. If the state is being asked 
to make such investments (which it undoubtedly has 
been making, and increasingly so, as financial markets 
have become even more speculative and short-termist), 
it is necessary for it to cover its inevitable losses when 
they arise.
Where technological breakthroughs have occurred as a 
result of targeted state interventions for specific compa-
nies, there is potential for the state to reap some of the 
financial rewards over time by retaining ownership of a 
small proportion of the intellectual property created. This 
is not to say the state should ever have exclusive license 
or hold a large enough proportion of the value of an inno-
vation to deter a wider spread of its application (and this 
has never been the case). The role of government is not to 
run commercial enterprises, but to spark innovation else-
where. However, a government should explore whether it 
is possible to own some of the value it has created, which 
over time could generate significantly higher value and 
then be reinvested into growth-generating investments. 
By adopting a “portfolio” approach to public investments 
in innovation, success from a few projects can then help 
cover the losses from many projects.
There are various ways to consider a direct return to the 
state for its investments in innovation. One is to make 
sure that loans and guarantees which are handed out by 
the state to businesses do not come without strings at-
tached. Loans and grants could have conditions, such 
as “income-contingent loans”, similar to student loans. 
If a company receives a loan or grant from the state, it 
should be required to pay back a portion of it if and when 
it makes profits above a certain threshold.32 This is not a 
complicated concept, of course, but it does run counter 
to some deep-seated assumptions. Currently, with budg-
et deficits under so much pressure, it is no longer possi-
ble to ignore the issue.
Apart from income-contingent loans, there is the possi-
bility of the state retaining equity in the companies that 
it supports. Indeed, this does occur in some countries, 
such as Israel (through the Yozma public venture capital 
fund) and Finland (where SITRA, one of Finland’s public 
funding agencies, retained equity in its early-stage in-
vestments in Nokia). To be sure, equity stakes are also 
retained by state investment banks, such as the Brazilian 
Development Bank (through its BNDESPAR subsidiary), 
the China Development Bank and the German KfW, which 
are lead investors in the emerging green economy.33 How-
ever, state equity in private companies is often feared in 
countries like the US and the UK (and other countries that 
have copied the Anglo-Saxon model) for fear that the next 
step is “communism”. Despite this fear, the most suc-
cessful capitalist economies have had active states mak-
32 M. Mazzuca t o : The Entrepreneurial State … , op. cit.
33 M. Mazzuca t o , C. Penna , op. cit.
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ing risky investments that resulted in true technological 
revolutions.34 We have been too quick to criticise public 
investments when things go wrong (for example, Con-
corde or Solyndra) and too slow to reward them when 
things go right (such as the Internet or Tesla).
 
A new framework requires new questions
The solutions derived from market failure theory (down-
sizing the state apparatus, promoting market-based 
mechanisms to counter market failures, insulating pub-
lic agencies from the private sector, etc.) might hold for 
steady-state situations, but not for those in which public 
policy is required for transformation, such as the techno-
logical and socio-economic missions of the past. Such 
missions required an emphasis not on fixing market fail-
ures or minimising government failures but on maximis-
ing the transformative impact of policy that can shape and 
create markets.
A recognition of the need for government policy to “trans-
form”, to be catalytic, and to create and shape markets, 
rather than merely fix them, helps to reframe the key 
questions of economic policy from static ones that wor-
ry about crowding out and picking winners to more dy-
namic ones that are constructive in forming the types of 
public-private interactions that can create new innovation 
and industrial landscapes. In this perspective, it is key 
for government to not just pick different technologies or 
sectors but ask what it wants from those sectors. In the 
same way that putting a man on the moon required the 
interaction of many sectors, the “green” revolution being 
pursued today also requires changes in all sectors. Green 
is not only about wind, solar and biofuels but also about 
new engines, new maintenance systems and new ways of 
thinking about product obsolescence.35 This is not about 
prescribing specific technologies but providing directions 
of change around which bottom-up solutions can then 
experiment. As Stirling recently put it:
The more demanding the innovation challenges like 
poverty, ill health or environmental damage, the great-
er becomes the importance of effective policy. This is 
not a question of “picking winners”—an uncertainty-
shrouded dilemma which is anyhow equally shared 
between public, private and third sectors. Instead, it is 
about engaging widely across society, in order to build 
34 C. Pe re z , op. cit.
35 M. Mazzuca t o , C. Pe re z : Innovation as Growth Policy, in: J. 
F age rbe rg , S. L aes t ad i u s , B. Ma r t i n  (eds.): The Triple Chal-
lenge: Europe in a New Age, Oxford 2014, forthcoming, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
the most fruitful conditions for deciding what “winning” 
even means.36
Government would benefit from adopting a portfolio 
approach to public investments in innovations, nurtur-
ing the explorative, plural, and trial and error aspects of 
change. This requires thinking not only about technologi-
cal change in a new way but also organisational change in 
order to build the public agencies of the future with crea-
tive, adaptive and explorative capacity.
In sum, to approach the innovation challenge of the fu-
ture, we must shift the discussion away from the worry 
about “picking winners” and “crowding out” and towards 
the four key areas mentioned above as limitations to mar-
ket failure theory.
Directions: How can public policy be understood in terms 
of setting the direction and route of change, that is, shap-
ing and creating markets rather than just fixing them? 
What can be learned from the ways in which directions 
were set in the past, and how can we stimulate more 
democratic debate about such directionality?
Evaluation: How can an alternative conceptualisation of 
the role of the public sector in the economy (alternative 
to market failure theory) be translated into new indica-
tors and assessment tools for evaluating public policies, 
beyond the micro-economic cost/benefit analysis? How 
does this alter the crowding out narrative?
Organisational change: How should public organisations 
be structured so they can accommodate the risk-taking 
and explorative capacity and the capabilities needed to 
envision and manage contemporary challenges?
Risks and rewards: How can this alternative conceptu-
alisation be put into practice so that it frames investment 
tools so that they not only socialise risk but also have po-
tential to socialise the rewards that enable smart growth 
to also be inclusive growth?
36 A. S t i r l i n g : Making choices in the face of uncertainty, Themed An-
nual Report of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Chapter 4, 
June 2014, mimeo.
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Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, Joseph E. Stiglitz*
The Rationale for Industrial and Innovation Policy
The evolution of industries in the last two centuries in all 
countries has been closely supported by a wide range of 
public policies addressing the patterns of capital accu-
mulation, trade rules, the organisation of markets, innova-
tive efforts and the process of knowledge creation and 
diffusion. Specific institutions have been created sup-
porting such developments and have played a key role in 
economic growth. The protection of infant industries, the 
definition of trade and intellectual property regimes, the 
distribution of rents, and the coherence with macroeco-
nomic policies are key elements of such policies. The cur-
rent challenges of industrial and innovation policies are 
discussed in the light of recent experiences in emerging 
countries.
 
The evolution of industries
A fundamental element in countries that successfully 
caught up with the leaders during the 19th and 20th cen-
turies was active government support of the catch-up 
process, involving various forms of protection and direct 
and indirect subsidy. The guiding policy argument has 
been the need for some protection of domestic industry 
from advanced firms in the leading nations in those indus-
tries judged at the time to be critical in the development 
process. Hamilton’s argument for infant industry protec-
tion in the new United States was virtually identical to that 
put forth half a century later by List regarding Germany’s 
needs.1 Gershenkron’s famous 1962 essay documented 
the policies and new institutions used in Continental Eu-
rope to enable catch-up with Britain.2 The same story also 
fits well with the case of Japan, and of Korea and Taiwan 
somewhat later. In many countries, these policies engen-
dered not a successful catch-up but rather the protection 
of an inefficient home industry. However, they also were 
the hallmark during the 20th century of all the countries 
* This paper draws upon M. C imo l i , G. Dos i , J.E. S t i g l i t z  (eds.): 
Industrial policy and development. The Political Economy of Capabili-
ties Accumulation, Oxford 2009, Oxford University Press, and on suc-
cessive joint work by the authors. The research leading to this work 
has enjoyed the long-term backing of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 
Columbia University.
1 A. Ham i l t on : Report on the Subject of Manufactures, 1791, in: H.C. 
S y re t t  (ed.): The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. X, New York 
1966, Columbia University Press; F. L i s t : The National System of Po-
litical Economy, London 1841, Longmans, Green and Co.
2 A. Ge r schenk ron : Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspec-
tive, Cambridge 1962, Harvard University Press.
that have now achieved their goals of catching up.3 We 
need to learn more about the circumstances under which 
infant industry protection leads to a strong indigenous in-
dustry and the conditions under which it is self-defeating.
These policies obviously angered companies in the lead-
ing countries (and their governments), particularly if the 
supported industry not only supplied its home market but 
began to encroach onto world markets. The case made 
for free trade after World War II was mostly concerned 
with eliminating import protection and subsidies among 
the rich countries, and at that time there was sympathy 
for the argument that some infant industry protection was 
often useful in developing countries. More recent inter-
national treaties, however, have increasingly been used 
to prevent the use of import protection and subsidies in 
countries seeking to catch up from far behind. Our belief 
is that Hamilton and List were and continue to be right 
that successful catch-up in industries where international 
trade is considerable requires some kind of infant indus-
try protection or other modes of support.
Table 1 summarises an exploratory taxonomy of policy 
interventions, measures and related institutions. Policies 
and other activities of “institutional engineering” affect (i) 
the technological capabilities of individual and corporate 
organisations, and the rate at which they actually learn; (ii) 
the economic signals that they face (including of course 
profitability signals and perceived opportunity costs); (iii) 
the ways they interact with each other and with non-mar-
ket institutions (e.g. public agencies, development banks, 
training and research entities).
All major developed countries engage in relatively high 
degrees of intervention – whether consciously conceived 
as industrial policies or not – that affect all the above 
variables. This applies even more so to the period when 
today’s developed countries were catching up with the 
international leaders. What primarily differentiate the 
various countries are the instruments, the institutional ar-
rangements and the philosophy of intervention.
3 For a broad historical overview of the role of policies in some now-
developed countries, see E.S. Re i ne r t : How Rich nations got Rich. 
Essays in the History of Economic Policy, Working paper No. 1, Centre 
for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, 2004.
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The case of Japan is a paradigmatic example of catching-
up policies.4 Interestingly, Japan appears to have acted 
comprehensively on all of the variables categorised in our 
taxonomy above. Strong discretionary intervention into 
the structure of signals (also involving formal and infor-
mal protection against imports and foreign investments) 
recreated the “vacuum environment” that is generally 
enjoyed only by technological leaders. However, this was 
matched by a pattern of fierce oligopolistic rivalry among 
Japanese companies and a strong export orientation, 
which fostered technological dynamism and prevented 
any exploitation of protection simply in terms of collusive 
monopolistic pricing.
It is tempting to evaluate this Japanese experience – not-
withstanding recent, mostly macroeconomic difficulties – 
against others that have been on average less successful, 
4 G. Dos i : Technical Change and Industrial Transformation, London, 
Macmillan and New York 1984, St. Martin Press.
such as the European ones, which heavily relied upon one 
single instrument, namely financial transfers (especially 
R&D subsidies and transfers on capital account), leav-
ing to the endogenous working of the international mar-
ket both the determination of the patterns of signals and 
the response capabilities of individual firms. Certainly, 
there are country-specific features of the Japanese ex-
ample which are hardly transferable. However, that case, 
in its striking outcome, points at a general possibility of 
reshaping the patterns of “comparative advantages” as 
they emerge from the endogenous evolution of the inter-
national markets.
The historical experience shows a great variety of coun-
try- and sector-specific combinations of the types of poli-
cies illustrated above. Some subtle commonalities none-
theless emerge.
The first common characteristic is the centrality of public 
agencies, such as universities, and public policies to the 
Table 1
Processes and institutions for policies on technological learning and industrial change
Sou rce : Authors’ elaboration.
Domains of policy intervention Policy measures Related institutions
(i) Opportunities of scientific and technological 
innovation
Science policies, graduate education, “frontier” 
technological projects
Research universities, public research centres, 
medical institutes, space and military agencies, 
etc.
(ii) Socially distributed learning and technological 
capabilities
Broader education and training policies From primary education to polytechnics to 
US-style “land-grant colleges”, etc.
(iii) Targeted industrial support measures affect-
ing e.g. types of firms – in primis  the structure, 
ownership and modes of governance of business 
firms (e.g. domestic vs. foreign, family vs. publicly 
owned companies)
From the formation of state-owned firms to their 
privatisation, from “national champions” policies 
to policies affecting multinational corporations’ 
(MNCs) investments, all the way to the legislation 
affecting corporate governance
State-owned holdings, public merchant banks, 
public “venture capitalists”, public utilities
(iv) The capabilities of economic agents (espe-
cially business firms) in terms of the technological 
knowledge they embody, the effectiveness and 
speed with which they search for new technologi-
cal and organisational advances, etc.
Cf. especially  points (ii), (iii) and R&D policies; 
policies affecting the adoption of new  
equipment, etc.
(v) The economic signals and incentives profit-
motivated agents face (including actual and 
expected prices and profit rates, appropriability 
conditions for innovations, entry barriers, etc.)
Price regulations; tariffs and quotas in  
international trade; intellectual property rights 
(IPR) regimes, etc.
Related regulatory agencies, agencies governing 
research and production subsidies, trade-
controlling entities, agencies granting and 
controlling IPRs
(vi) Selection mechanisms (overlapping with the 
above)
Policies and legislation affecting anti-trust and 
competition, entry and bankruptcy, allocation of 
finance, markets for corporate ownership, etc.
Anti-trust authorities, institutions governing 
bankruptcy procedures, etc.
(vii) Patterns of distribution of information and of 
interaction amongst different types of agents, 
e.g. customers, suppliers, banks, shareholders, 
managers, workers
Governance of labour markets, product markets, 
bank-industry relationships, etc., all the way to 
collectively shared arrangements for intra-firm 
information-sharing mobility and control, forms 
of cooperation and competition amongst rival 
firms, etc. (cf. for example the historical  
differences between Japanese and Anglo-Saxon 
firms)
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generation and establishment of new technological para-
digms. This has been the case since the 19th century.
Second, and relatedly, incentives are often not enough. 
A crucial role of industrial and innovation policies is to 
expand the capabilities of actors, especially in the case 
of new technological paradigms, but also in all cases of 
catching up in which no reasonable incentive structure 
might be sufficient to motivate private actors to surmount 
big technological lags.
Third, market discipline is helpful in so far as it weeds out 
the poor performers and rewards the high performers 
within particular populations of firms. However, nothing 
guarantees that powerful selective shocks will not wipe 
out the entire populations, thus also eliminating any future 
learning possibility.
Fourth, policies – especially those aimed at catching up 
– generally face the need to balance measures aimed at 
capability building (and at protecting the “infant learner”) 
with mechanisms to curb inertia and rent-seeking. For ex-
ample, the latter are one of the major elements missing 
from the old Latin American experience of import sub-
stitution, while the former are lacking under many of the 
more recent “liberalisation” policies.
Fifth, a successful catching-up effort in terms of per cap-
ita income and wages has always been accompanied by 
catching up in the new and most dynamic technological 
paradigms, irrespective of the initial patterns of compara-
tive advantages, specialisation and market-generated 
signals. Our conjecture is that, ceteris paribus, the struc-
tural need in a particular country for policies that also af-
fect the patterns of economic signals (including relative 
prices and relative profitability) as they emerge from the 
international market will be greater, the larger the distance 
of the country from the technological frontier. This is what 
Amsden provocatively called policies of deliberately “get-
ting the prices wrong”.5 Conversely, endogenous market 
mechanisms tend to behave in a “virtuous” manner for 
those countries that happen to be on the frontier, espe-
cially in the newest and most promising technologies. 
This is broadly confirmed by historical experience: uncon-
ditional free trade often happened to be advocated and 
fully exploited only by the technologically and politically 
leading countries.
Such lessons from the past are useful in so far as they 
also apply to the future. Today, policy making ought to be 
acutely aware of the fact that future capabilities build up-
on, refine and modify incumbent ones: hence the policy 
5 A. Amsden : Asia Next Giant, 1989, Cornell University Press.
goal of building good path dependencies.6 We now pre-
sent several feasible policies that go in this direction.
 
The necessity of nurturing infant industries
Safeguarding the possibility of learning is indeed the first 
basic pillar of the infant industry logic.
On the incentive side, market signals left to themselves 
are often not enough and indeed frequently discourage 
the accumulation of technological capabilities in so far as 
they ought to occur in activities currently displaying sig-
nificant comparative disadvantages and thus also unfa-
vourable current profitability. Incidentally, note that finan-
cial markets are inadequate instruments for translating 
a future and uncertain potential for learning into current 
investment decisions.7 Thus, there are sound learning-re-
lated reasons for why historical evidence shows that, just 
prior to industrial catching up, average industrial import 
tariffs are relatively low; they rise rapidly in the catching-
up phase, and they fall after a mature industrialisation. 
Indeed, it is during the catching-up phase that the ne-
cessity of distorting (international) market signals is more 
acute, precisely because of the young and still relatively 
fragile learning infant industries. This has partly to do with 
the fact that many forms of protection entail the possibil-
ity of learning but not, in the language of Khan and Blank-
enburg, the “compulsion” to innovate, as distinct from the 
sheer incentive to just exploit a monopoly rent, no matter 
how inefficient and lazy the potential “learner” is (more on 
this below).8 Partly, it has to do with the conditions of ca-
pabilities accumulation and the characteristics of the ac-
tors involved.
After all, even under the best intentions and incentives, in-
dustrialisation might have rather little to do with the sheer 
award of property rights and with the establishment of 
firms as legal entities.9 Of course, the legal context does 
matter and is likely to be a conducive condition. However, 
this is far from sufficient. In fact, it is quite misleading to 
think that all over the world there are plenty of sources 
of technological knowledge just waiting to be exploited, 
6 See also R. Hausmann , D. Rod r i c k : Doomed to Choose: Indus-
trial Policy as Predicament, CID Working Paper, Harvard University, 
2006.
7 See J.E. S t i g l i t z : Whither Socialism?, Cambridge, MA 1994, The 
MIT Press; J.E. S t i g l i t z , B.C. G reenwa l d : Creating a Learning 
Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Pro-
gress, New York 2014, Columbia University Press.
8 M.H. Khan , S. B l ankenbu rg : The Political Economy of Indus-
trial Policy in Asia and Latin America, in: M. C imo l i , G. Dos i , J.E. 
S t i g l i t z , op. cit.
9 See M. Hobday, F. Pe r i n i : Latecomer Entrepreneurship: A Policy 
Perspective, in: M. C imo l i , G. Dos i , J.E. S t i g l i t z , op. cit.
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with the lag due mainly to institutional and incentive-relat-
ed forces. In fact, irrespective of the opportunities for the 
entrepreneurial exploitation of technological knowledge 
that are notionally offered by the “international knowledge 
frontier”, the fundamental gap exists precisely because 
of a lack of capabilities in exploring and exploiting them. 
This is a crucial bottleneck for development. “Horizontal” 
policies of education and training, together with techni-
cal support to firms by public institutions, can go a long 
way in the capability-enhancing direction. But even that is 
not likely to be enough. Fostering the emergence and oc-
casionally explicitly building technologically and organi-
sationally competent firms are indeed fundamental infant-
nurturing tasks.
Needless to say, the absence/existence of mature techno-
logical capabilities and “dynamic capabilities” for chang-
ing them in any one country is not a binary variable.10 
However, the distribution is highly uneven. Several dozen 
countries hardly show any of these capabilities, while oth-
ers display a few technologically progressive organisa-
tions in a bigger sea of less dynamic firms. In fact, even 
in the most developed countries, only a fraction of the 
population of firms can be considered technologically dy-
namic organisations. (Note that this applies to both high-
tech and low-tech sectors as conventionally defined). In 
a sense, industrialisation has to do with the properties of 
changing distributions between “progressive” and “back-
ward” firms. How do policies affect this process? Dahl-
man reports on China and India, but his findings apply 
well beyond these two country cases.11 Policies involved 
the following aspects:
• state ownership
• selective credit allocation
• favourable tax treatment to selective industries
• restrictions on foreign investment
• local context requirements
• special IPR regimes
• government procurement
• promotion of large domestic firms.
In a nutshell, this is the full list of the capital sins which the 
market faithful are supposed to avoid!
Here again is a widespread misunderstanding to be dis-
pelled, which goes under the heading of “picking the 
winner” or “national champion” fallacies. Why should 
10 See D. Teece , G. P i s ano , A. Shuen : Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management, in: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, 
No. 7, 1997, pp. 509-533.
11 C.J. Dah lman : Growth and Development in China and India: The 
Role of Industrial Innovation Policy in Rapid Catch-Up, in: M. C imo l i , 
G. Dos i , J.E. S t i g l i t z , op. cit.
governments foster national oligopolists or monopolists 
in the first place? And how could governments be more 
“competent” than the market in selecting which firms are 
technologically better?
There certainly are unintentional or even counterinten-
tional outcomes of discretionary industrial policies. Of 
course, pro-market advocates typically quote the fail-
ures of the computer support programmes among OECD 
countries and the Concorde project in Europe as arche-
types of such “government failures” to be put down on 
the table against “market failures”. Economists more 
sympathetic to the positive role of the public visible hand, 
including us, would find it easy to offer the cases of Air-
bus and ST Microelectronics in Europe or Petrobras and 
Embraer in Brazil, among many others, as good coun-
terexamples.12 However, our point goes well beyond 
this. The “picking the winner” idea basically builds on 
the unwarranted myth that there are many “competitors 
out there” in the market, and the government has the ar-
rogance of knowing better than the market in selecting 
which competitor to support. This is often far from real-
ity in developed countries and is even more unrealistic in 
catching-up ones. In fact, the major vehicles of learning 
and catching up in all episodes of successful industri-
alisation, with the possible exception of little Singapore, 
have been domestic firms – sometimes alone and some-
times in joint ventures with foreign MNCs – and only rare-
ly MNCs themselves. This holds true from German and 
American industrialisation all the way to China currently 
– possibly the case nearest to a two-pronged strategy of 
fostering the development of domestic firms and trying 
to squeeze out of foreign MNCs as much technological 
knowledge as possible.
“Infant-nurturing” measures have been a major ingredi-
ent of development policies throughout the history of in-
dustrialisation. Historically, the infant learners had to be 
shielded or helped in the domestic and international mar-
kets essentially in their interactions with the more efficient 
and more innovative firms from “frontier” countries. This 
happens to a large extent also today. However, China’s 
industrial policies have given it an absolute cost advan-
tage in an expanding set of goods, including those which 
were/are central to industrial production in many low and 
middle income countries.13 In that respect, the magnitude 
and the speed of Chinese industrialisation risk exerting a 
sort of crowding out effect vis-à-vis the industrialising po-
12 See M. P i an t a : An industrial policy for Europe, in: Seoul Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2014.
13 China quickly reduces its absolute disadvantages across the board, 
in both more traditional productions and in activities based on the 
newest technological paradigms, at rates higher than its catching-up 
in wages (notwithstanding the fast growth of the latter).
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tential of many other countries. So, for example, Brazil – a 
country on the upper tail of the distribution of industrialis-
ers in terms of technological capabilities  turns out to be 
a very “high wage” country compared to China, but so 
are other less developed Latin America countries. Even 
African countries are losing cost-based international (and 
domestic) competitiveness vis-à-vis China.
In the interactions between infant learners and more ma-
ture firms, there is no reason to give up the infant-nur-
turing philosophy. On the contrary, they provide all the 
more reason to pursue the “capital policy sins” mentioned 
above. Moreover, they ought to serve as an impetus for 
the more explicit use of domestic or regional markets as 
venues for the cultivation of an emerging national industry 
even when the latter tends to be squeezed on the inter-
national arena between “advanced productions” and Chi-
nese exports.
 
Infant industries under the new international trade 
regime
A central novelty in the current organisation of interna-
tional economic relations is the regulatory regime stem-
ming from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
agreements on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). This historically unprecedented 
regime implies a significant reduction in the degrees of 
freedom developing countries can enjoy in their trade 
policies, in contrast to the catching-up countries in the 
preceding waves of industrialisation, which could exploit 
a large menu of quotas, tariffs and other forms of barriers. 
The TRIPS agreements have led to stronger constraints 
on what is admissible in terms of subsidies and other dis-
cretionary forms of support to firms and industries. This 
state of affairs has made it more difficult for new players 
– new firms, new sectors, new emerging economies – to 
enter existing industries. What can be done?
Actually, quite a few things can be done within the incum-
bent agreements, full as they are of loopholes and provi-
sions for exceptions, generally put there by the negotia-
tors from developed countries with an eye on their special 
interests – ranging from dubiously defined “anti-dumping 
measures” to national safety and security considerations. 
Developed countries have been quick to exploit these 
provisions, while developing countries have rarely done 
so, overwhelmed by the combined powers of money, 
political clout, legal sophistication and the potential for 
blackmail by stronger states. At least equally common 
thus far has been the unawareness of these opportunities 
for pragmatic management, certainly worsened – we cari-
cature on purpose – by Chicago-trained economic minis-
ters who truly believe that all of their country’s problems 
stem from the fact that trade liberalisation has not gone 
far enough, and by directors-general of the ministries of 
trade who were taught that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Sam-
uelson theorem on gains from trade is the last word on 
the subject. In this respect, we believe that if catching-up 
countries could display the same amount of pragmatism 
(someone would say cynicism) currently practised by e.g. 
US representatives at the WTO, many degrees of free-
dom could be regained even under current rules. There 
are other actions which would also help, such as avoiding 
“bilateral” agreements at all costs.
In brief, “bilateral” agreements are WTO-plus – and in 
terms of intellectual property rights, “TRIPS-plus” – 
agreements whose ultimate aim is to close the loopholes, 
exceptions and safeguard clauses of the original WTO 
and TRIPS agreements, freezing them in favour of com-
panies and industries from the developed world. A bilat-
eral agreement might offer “preferred country clauses” to 
a developing country, typically concerning textile exports 
and the like. However, such an agreement has minimal 
benefit to the developing country, since Chinese exports 
are still more competitive globally even if all tariffs on the 
developing country’s exports are removed. On the other 
side, the provisions of the bilateral agreement often in-
volve the unconditional acceptance of the IPR regime 
imposed by the developed partner and curbs on imports 
from third countries of commodities produced under 
the various waivers still permitted under the WTO. While 
there are significant and still largely unexploited degrees 
of freedom unintentionally provided by the current inter-
national trade institutions and rules, the straightjacket is 
likely to remain tight. As Dahlman remarks, if China and 
India
had liberalised from the beginning it is unlikely that 
they would be the strong economic powers that they 
have become. To a large extent, some of the strengths 
of both countries are that they developed strong capa-
bilities before they liberalized.14
The point also applies, of course, to countries which are 
just beginning their processes of capability accumulation. 
But then the conclusion is that some trade renegotiation 
is going to be necessary. It is reasonable, for example, 
to switch to a regime in which the object of multilateral 
agreement is average industrial tariffs, as opposed to tar-
iffs that are line-by-line or that apply to specific products 
and sectors.
14 C.J. Dah lman , op. cit., p. 320.
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Such a system is simpler than the current structure of 
tariff commitments and would also reconcile multilateral 
discipline with policy flexibility, since countries would be 
subject to an overall average ceiling while maintaining 
degrees of freedom for discretionary sectoral strategies. 
In practice, it would have the effect of balancing tariff in-
creases and reductions, since a country would need to 
lower its practiced tariffs on some products in order to be 
able to raise them on others. This would encourage gov-
ernments to view tariffs as temporary instruments and 
focus their efforts on ensuring that they effectively serve 
the purpose they are designed for, namely to provide 
breathing space for infant industries before they mature 
and catch up with their counterparts in more advanced 
countries. Moreover, the average ceiling itself ought to 
depend on a country’s level of technological and eco-
nomic development, rising as the catching-up process 
is put in motion and falling as industrialisation becomes 
mature.
 
Management of the distribution of rents favourable 
to learning and industrialisation
The other side of infant-nurturing policies regards the rent 
distribution profile that they entail. We have already em-
phasised that allowing, say, the use of a temporary trade 
barrier as an opportunity to learn and mature does not im-
ply per se the incentive to do so, and may instead be used 
to simply exploit the rents stemming from the protection. 
As outlined by Khan and Blankenburg, successful indus-
trialisation policies have all come with rent management 
strategies that provide compulsions for learning and for 
the accumulation of both technological capabilities and 
production capacity.15 There are three sides to such strat-
egies.
First, on the “carrot” side, policies must be able to trans-
fer resources to the “progressive actors”: fiscal policies, 
subsidies, preferential credits and grants are among the 
possible means. In fact, fiscal policies are particularly 
important in the transfer of resources from those activi-
ties which benefit from (cyclical or, even more so, trend) 
improvements in the terms of trade of natural resources 
– in the form of export levies, royalties indexed on the final 
price of the commodities, and fines and taxes discourag-
ing environmental damage. Moreover, the construction of 
industrialisation-friendly financial institutions is of para-
mount importance. The absence of “industry-friendly” 
intermediation of finance is a major bottleneck for both 
learning and investment – as witnessed by most Latin 
American countries in recent decades.
15 M.H. Khan , S. B l ankenbu rg , op. cit.
Second, on the “stick” side, governments must have the 
credibility to commit to developmental rents for periods 
that are sufficiently long, but not too long (which depends 
on the sectors; the nature of the technologies; the dis-
tance from the international frontier; and the initial capa-
bilities of managers, technicians, workers, etc.). Here, the 
critical requirement is the credible commitment to stop 
all rent-yielding measures after some time and to impose 
sanctions on firms and industries failing to achieve tech-
nological investment or export targets.
Third, the nurturing of domestic oligopolists has to be 
matched by measures fostering competition. There is a 
general lesson from the experiences of Korea and Ja-
pan, where quasi-monopolistic or oligopolistic domes-
tic firms were forced, quite early on, to compete fiercely 
in international markets. And above some threshold of 
industrial development, anti-trust policies are an im-
portant deterrent against the lazy exploitation of “infant 
protection”. Indeed, the management of rent distribution 
in its relation with industrial learning is one of the most 
difficult and most crucial tasks of any industrialisation 
strategy, as it concerns the overall distribution of in-
come, wealth and political power across economic and 
social groups.
 
Tight IPR regimes never help industrialisation – and 
sometimes harm it
All catching-up countries – including the United States 
and Germany long ago – have done so through a lot of 
imitation, reverse engineering and straightforward copy-
ing. But these activities are precisely what strong proper-
ty right protection is meant to prevent. How effective IPRs 
are in achieving this objective depends a lot on the tech-
nologies and the sectors, but certainly when they are ef-
fective, they are likely to represent an obstacle to domes-
tic technological learning. Conversely, even if IPR protec-
tion serves as an incentive to innovate in frontier countries 
– a claim which is indeed quite controversial and not sup-
ported by particularly robust evidence16 – there is no evi-
dence that it has any positive effect in spurring innovative 
activities in catching-up countries. Certainly, successful 
industrialisers at some point start innovating and also 
patenting, but typically – a century ago as well as today – 
they fill their patent claim in frontier countries where their 
strongest competitors are likely to be based. At the same 
time, the domestic IPR regime has been characteristically 
16 For a discussion see G. Dos i , L. Ma rengo , C. Pasqua l i : How 
much should society fuel the greed of innovators? On the Relations 
Between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation, in: 
Research Policy, Vol. 35, No. 8, 2006, pp. 1110-1121.
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weak. The situation, however, has recently changed with 
the TRIPS agreements, which have basically extended 
the tightest IPR rules of developed countries to all of the 
signing countries, including developing ones, and has 
been made even worse by the already mentioned bilateral 
agreements. Further, TRIPS has eliminated the possibility 
of differentiating the regime of protection across products 
and technologies.
What can catching-up countries do? First, they must be 
aware and never buy the story that “IPRs are good for 
development because they are good for innovation”. On 
the contrary, in many technological areas, they are largely 
irrelevant for both innovation and technological catching-
up. In other areas, particularly pharmaceuticals, they are 
definitely harmful for imitation and capability-building in 
catching-up countries. An additional consequence of 
such awareness is the need for greater efforts to build in-
stitutional capabilities and for a clear technology acqui-
sition strategy to orient negotiations and dispute settle-
ments.
Second, and relatedly, the TRIPS agreements contain a 
series of loopholes, safeguard clauses and exceptional 
provisions – for example concerning compulsory licens-
ing – which catching-up countries must still learn how to 
exploit.
Third, the most advanced of the catching-up countries 
ought to strive to offer the less developed ones appeal-
ing regional agreements which could be viable alterna-
tives to the bilateral agreements with the US and EU 
that generally contain even stricter IPR provisions than 
TRIPS.
Last but not least, there is a need for a new wave of mul-
tilateral negotiations which aim at:
• reducing the breadth and width of IPR coverage
• expanding the domain of unpatentability, from scien-
tific knowledge to algorithms to data
• conditioning the degrees of IPR protection on the rela-
tive level of economic and technological development 
of each country.
After all, the current international IPR regime is largely 
a response to the special appropriability interest of a 
small sub-set of developed countries’ firms – basically 
Big Pharma and biotech, Microsoft and Hollywood. A re-
form in the manner indicated here would benefit not just 
catching-up countries but also first world consumers, 
without doing any harm to the overall rate of innovation.
The necessary consistency between macro- 
economic and industrial policies
As extensively discussed in Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 
there are macroeconomic policies which can kill most 
learning efforts along with the related learning capa-
bilities.17 The sudden and indiscriminate dismantling of 
trade barriers can easily do this, especially when com-
bined with the reckless (non-) management of exchange 
rates, characterised by vicious cycles of appreciation 
followed by sudden devaluations. Such cycles have only 
been amplified by the stubborn refusal to utilise controls 
over capital movements, especially short-term move-
ments. 
Blind trust in the “magic of the marketplace” and the as-
sociated lack of fiscal policies and demand management 
increases output volatility. In turn, this volatility, together 
with the endemic financial fragility of many developing 
countries’ firms, induces waves of corporate mortal-
ity and the resultant disappearance of the capabilities 
of technological accumulation. Even among surviving 
firms, behaviours tend to become more short-term and 
the economy tends to respond more to financial signals 
than to long-term learning opportunities.18 A compari-
son of the vicious feedback loops between macro policy 
shocks prescribed by orthodox recipes and micro dy-
namics (e.g. in Latin America) versus the virtuous feed-
back loops between more interventionist and “Keynes-
ian” macro policies and the continuing industrial expan-
sion even under severe financial crises (e.g. in Korea) 
demonstrate the importance of getting industrial and 
innovation policy right.
17 M. C imo l i , G. Dos i , J.E. S t i g l i t z , op. cit.
18 See also J.A. Ocampo , L. Ta y l o r : Trade liberalization in developing 
economies: modest benefits but problems with productivity growth, 
macro prices, and income distribution, in: The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 108, No. 450, 1998, pp. 1523-1546; and J.E. S t i g l i t z , J.A. Oc -
ampo , S. Sp i ege l , R. F f rench -dav i s , D. Nayya r : Stability with 
Growth. Macroeconomics, liberalization and development, New York 
2006, Oxford University Press.
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This article discusses the arguments underlying the use of 
industrial policy in advanced and less advanced econo-
mies. It reviews both arguments in favour and against the 
use of industrial policy in different economic and politico-
economic contexts, and it explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different types of industrial policies. 
There is a lively debate on these issues in the current con-
text of the European economy, where major problems 
have been recognised over the past decades, particu-
larly since the onset of the financial and economic crisis 
in 2008. Amongst these problems, we single out two in 
particular. First, the rather slow overall growth trajectory 
of the European economy, and particularly its productivity 
growth performance, in relation to the US economy since 
the early 1990s. Linked to that is the concern that Europe 
has not been at the forefront of the main innovative tech-
nological trajectories, e.g. in information technology and 
bio-engineering, and shows little sign that this is going to 
change. Second, there is a fear that the EU has stopped 
delivering on its promise of convergence, i.e. that lower-
income economies and regions would follow a sustained 
catching-up process towards the higher incomes and 
productivity levels of the more advanced European econ-
omies. There is a recognition of the fact that the European 
economy shows severe imbalances, which are revealed 
as sustained external account deficits in a range of lower- 
and medium-income economies and which can be traced 
to severe long-term weaknesses in exporting capacity in 
these economies. This in turn reflects strong agglomera-
tion features of industrial activity in Europe.1
Both these considerations lie behind the renewed interest 
in industrial policy and the need to avoid some of the pit-
falls that characterised earlier versions of such policies.
Review of the debate on industrial policy
Industrial policy had fallen into disrepute since the 1980s 
mainly on the basis of two arguments. First, why should 
governments have more information about the direction in 
which structural change should be encouraged than the 
actors in the private sector? Second, if policy measures 
were used to differentially benefit particular industries or 
1 For more details on this, see M. L andesmann : The North-South 
Divide in Europe: Can the European Convergence Model be Resus-
citated?, in: J. F age rbe rg  (ed.): The Challenge for Europe in a New 
Age, Oxford, forthcoming, Oxford University Press; and M. L andes -
mann : Structural Dynamics of Europe’s Periphery – Which are the 
Main Issues, in: Journal of Economic Policy Reform, forthcoming.
Michael A. Landesmann
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types of enterprises, such policy measures would be sub-
ject to lobbying efforts and rent-seeking behaviour (in the 
worst case, shared by both policy makers and the groups 
which benefit from the measures), and hence – even if the 
proper allocation of such funds were known – they would 
be wrongly allocated and not benefit the aims of industrial 
policy.
Industrial policies were thus largely pushed aside in the 
policy debate, even though in practice the traditional tools 
of industrial policy remained in widespread use (such as 
subsidies or tax exemptions of various types, conces-
sional credit, privileged access to public tenders, and 
infrastructural support, including training and R&D facili-
ties benefiting particular groups of firms/industries or re-
gions).
More recently, there has been a revival of the role indus-
trial policies can play, partly driven by concerns about the 
impact of the international financial and economic crisis, 
partly in response to the structural adjustment processes 
resulting from the impact of fast international economic 
integration (globalisation), and partly from the insights 
gained from the development literature on successes and 
failures of various forms of government interventions and 
business-government relationships observed in the de-
veloping world.
In this context, Rodrik states that the issue is no longer 
the whether of industrial policy but rather the how, i.e. 
whether one can “design institutions that take into ac-
count the informational and political problems which have 
preoccupied industrial policy skeptics”.2 Hence, there is 
general agreement that in any assessment of industrial 
policy, explicit attention has to be paid to government fail-
ures, the capture of government policy by special interest 
groups, and the efficiency and quality with which govern-
ment agencies operate.
Definitions of industrial policy
Let us start with definitions of industrial policy, narrowing 
the very wide range provided in the literature to those def-
initions which we find suitable for this particular paper.3
2 D. Rod r i k : Normalizing Industrial Policy, Commission on Growth 
and Development, Working Paper No. 3, Cambridge and Washington 
2008, p. 2.
3 See e.g. K. Wa rw i c k : Beyond Industrial Policy. Emerging issues and 
new trends, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, 
No. 2, OECD Publishing, 2012.
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Aghion defines industrial policy as “adequately targeted” 
if it “targets a particular market failure (such as knowl-
edge externalities or financial market imperfections)”.4 
Pack and Saggi consider industrial policy as
basically any type of selective intervention or govern-
ment policy that attempts to alter the structure of pro-
duction toward sectors that are expected to offer bet-
ter prospects for economic growth than would occur in 
the absence of such intervention.5
A similar definition by Crafts considers the objective to 
change the distribution of resources across economic 
sectors as the defining element of industrial policy.6 War-
wick widens the Pack and Saggi definition somewhat in 
the following way:
Industrial policy is any type of intervention or govern-
ment policy that attempts to improve the business en-
vironment or to alter the structure of economic activ-
ity toward sectors, technologies or tasks that are ex-
pected to offer better prospects for economic growth 
or societal welfare than would occur in the absence of 
such intervention, i.e. in the market equilibrium.7
The above definitions emphasise the impact of industri-
al policies on the economic structure. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also links in-
dustrial policy to competitiveness. According to Article 
173 TFEU, the objective of the EU’s industrial policy is to 
provide the appropriate conditions for making EU indus-
try internationally competitive. This objective recognises 
that businesses themselves are ultimately responsible for 
their success or failure in the global market, but industrial 
policy can support – but potentially also impede – firms or 
whole industries in gaining international competitiveness. 
These broad definitions do not confine industrial policies 
to manufacturing. In fact, many recent contributions in the 
literature on industrial policy stress that effective meas-
ures should encompass the entire value chain and the 
whole spectrum of the economy.
Another well-known argument is the public goods argu-
ment in favour of providing infrastructure (transport, com-
munications, standards, etc.) which would be insufficient-
4 P. Agh i on : Growth Policy and the State: Implications for the Design 
of a European Growth Package, LSE Growth Commission, 10 June 
2012, footnote 2.
5 H. Pack , K. Sagg i : Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Criti-
cal Survey, in: World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2006, 
pp. 267-297.
6 N. C r a f t s : Overview and Policy Implications, in: Learning from some 
of Britain’s successful sectors: An historical analysis of the role of 
government, BIS Economics Papers No. 6, March 2010, pp. 1-17.
7 K. Wa rw i c k , op. cit., p. 12.
ly provided by private suppliers and could be welfare di-
minishing, as it could lead to the exclusion of users. There 
is also the coordination failure argument, which refers to 
situations when a development effort would require the 
mobilisation of a significant set of complementary inputs 
(some of them of a governance type) which the sponta-
neous decision-making in the market could generally not 
provide, especially in the presence of significant “indivis-
ibilities” of such inputs. In such circumstances, the state 
(at national, regional or cross-national levels) has to pro-
vide a “push” in the direction of such coordinated efforts.8
Linked with this is the influence that industrial policy can 
exert on the path-dependent process of innovation and 
the diffusion of technology.9 This has become particularly 
prominent in the debate about climate change and how to 
counteract it with the development of “green technology”. 
The role played by the US Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, e.g. in the development of the internet, is famous 
in this respect. Pisano and Shih emphasise the impor-
tance of the long-term commitment that public involve-
ment in the development of such technological trajecto-
ries has to show – acting as a coordinating and supporting 
agent to encourage networking activities amongst firms, 
research institutions and universities.10 Also, the support 
provided through public procurement policy is important 
here, as it is in areas in which the military sector is directly 
and indirectly involved.11
In this context, Rodrik emphasises that innovation and 
technology absorption takes place within a framework 
which shapes the direction of technological develop-
ments (in advanced and developing countries) and ex-
tends the analysis to consider the role which industrial 
policy can play in influencing a country’s or region’s pat-
tern of industrial specialisation.12
8 See the “big push” theories of economic development started by P. 
Rosens t e i n -Rodan : Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 53, No. 210-211, 
June-September 1943, pp. 202-211; and more recently elaborated by 
K. Mu rphy, A. Sh l e i f e r, R. V i s hny : Industrialization and the Big 
Push, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 5, October 1989, 
pp. 1003-1026.
9 See P. Agh i on , D. Acemog l u , L. Bu r s z t yn , D. Hemous : The 
environment and directed technical change, Working Paper 2010.93, 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei; and P. Agh i on , A. Dechez l ep re t re , 
D. Hemous , R. Ma r t i n , J. Van  Reenen : Testing for Path Depend-
ence in Clean versus Dirty Innovation: Evidence from the Automotive 
Industry, unpublished manuscript, 2010.
10 P.S. P i s ano , W.C. Sh i h : Restoring American Competitiveness, in: 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 87, 2009, pp. 114-125.
11 See e.g. R. Po l l i n , D. Bake r : Public Investment, Industrial Policy 
and US Economic Revival, Joint CEPR-PERI Working Paper 211, Lon-
don and Washington 2009.
12 D. Rod r i k , op. cit.
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The role of influencing and strategically planning a coun-
try’s (or region’s) position in an international setting has 
gained further importance in an age in which value chains 
are growing more fragmented and there are increasing 
options for countries and regions to plug themselves into 
international and regional production networks. Publicly 
provided “specific inputs” (see below) are therefore not 
only relevant at the industry level, but their role is also to 
support the local production of particular “fragments” in 
international production activity.
Industrial policy and other policies
What about relationships between industrial policy and 
other policies? We shall discuss three such policies: com-
petition policy, provision of public goods, and trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) policy.
Competition policy
Aghion et al. argue that since industrial policy targets 
sectors rather than particular firms, it can be quite com-
patible – in fact complementary – to competition policy.13 
Industrial policy could/should encourage the entry of new 
firms, especially in high innovation industries, but also in 
older industries where “churning” (i.e. the exit of existing 
firms and entry of new firms) is required. Industrial policy 
could be explicitly directed towards reducing structural 
entry barriers and the advantages of incumbent firms.
An additional argument for the potential complementarity 
between industrial policy and competition policy is that 
the latter provides a framework for “proper governance” 
of industrial policies. A strong and independent competi-
tion authority with clear and transparent rules governing 
its decision-making can be an important complemen-
tary agency for strong, forward-looking industrial policy 
measures. In this context, it is interesting to point out that 
the institutional design of the EU puts it into a particularly 
favourable position in this respect, as competition policy 
has been delegated to the EU level, and hence it is some-
what removed from capture by the national lobbying ef-
forts of incumbent firms. There is of course a conflict 
zone between a very high degree of competition (contest-
ability) in markets and the willingness for firms to commit 
large ex ante investments into developing new products 
or new types of technologies, branching out into new ar-
eas of international specialisation, etc. This conflict zone 
will have to be explicitly addressed in the interaction be-
tween competition authorities and agencies responsible 
for industrial policy, but it is this interaction which has a 
13 P. Agh i on , J. Bou l ange r, E. Cohen : Rethinking Industrial Policy, 
Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/04, Brussels 2011.
chance to push the pattern of industrial policy in a direc-
tion that facilitates a forward-looking form of industrial 
policy. The rules of conflict resolution could specify the 
activities to be supported, for example, those with long 
lead times in product or technology development, those 
that embark on new areas of product or technology de-
velopment, those that support new entrants as against 
cementing the market positions of incumbents, those 
that support new patterns of specialisation with poten-
tially high returns in terms of future learning and technol-
ogy spillovers, etc.
Provision of public goods
Hausmann and Rodrik see the provision of “public in-
puts” as a core element of industrial policy.14 They also 
emphasise that public inputs tend to be highly specific 
to the activity in question. They point out that industri-
al policy is there to support new activities and change 
the pattern of specialisation, to provide “specific inputs” 
conducive to supporting these new activities, or to push 
the economy towards an evolving new pattern of spe-
cialisation rather than allowing the economy to become 
entrenched in an existing pattern. Older activities have 
an incumbent’s advantage over new activities because of 
sunk costs and established lobbying powers, and hence 
a forward-looking industrial policy maker is perfectly en-
titled to positively discriminate in favour of these new ac-
tivities. Difficult political economy problems have to be 
faced to overcome the advantages of incumbents – apart 
from sheer lobbying advantages, they may also point to 
a better “track record” compared to the new activities, 
which do not have the sunk cost advantage and are also 
not as far along on the learning curve. Hence, the ana-
lytically correct assessment of performance measures 
should be forward-looking, i.e. comparing present val-
ues of future flows of social returns likely to emerge from 
alternative decisions about public support. In practice, 
such measures will not be easy (countering the argu-
ments of incumbents in favour of “proven track records” 
and lower risk), but they nonetheless have to be attempt-
ed to break the asymmetric advantages of incumbent 
firms and activities.
Trade and FDI policy
There is no doubt that trade policy played an important 
role in economies’ catching-up episodes,15 be it through 
14 R. Hausmann , D. Rod r i k : Doomed to Choose: Industrial Policy as 
Predicament, mimeo September 2006.
15 See e.g. A. Amsden : Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late In-
dustrialisation; Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989; H.-J. Chang : 
Kicking away the ladder: development strategy in historical perspec-
tive, Anthem Press, London 2002.
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direct import restrictions (tariffs, quotas, various types 
of non-tariff barriers), through preferential treatment of 
domestic producers in the domestic market (e.g. public 
procurement policies) or through export supports of vari-
ous types (export credits, various supports to access for-
eign markets, FDI supports such as export-processing 
zones, etc.). While certain realms of trade (and FDI) policy 
have been restricted through various types of trade policy 
agreements (of a bilateral or multilateral type), other areas 
remain of great importance.
Developments over recent decades have been two-sid-
ed. On the one hand, there has been a strong increase in 
various forms of international integration: there has been 
an increase in the range of activities which have become 
tradable, particularly various types of services activities; 
a new dimension of international integration has evolved 
through the splitting up of the value chain, which has led 
to the specialisation and integration of tasks in produc-
tion processes across borders; and there has been a 
substantial increase in the international mobility of high-
skilled professionals. On the other hand, there has also 
been more pressure to move towards a more liberalised 
trade policy regime. These two tendencies of course have 
conditioned each other: increased liberalisation has led to 
more integration, and the increased openness of econo-
mies has meant an increase in vulnerability with regard to 
detrimental outbreaks of trade policy conflicts and thus 
a need to move towards policy coordination and policy 
arbitrage.
The upshot is that commonly used trade policy instru-
ments have changed from the direct use of import-re-
stricting policies (often based on the “infant industry” 
argument) to other instruments (e.g. non-tariff barriers, 
financing instruments, public supports in market access, 
and indirect instruments strengthening export activities 
such as R&D and training supports, export process-
ing zones, etc.). Analysis and policy positions have also 
changed in the direction of a dynamic perception of a 
country’s position in the international division of labour, 
i.e. of the place which a country’s producers occupy in 
international production structures, be it at the level of 
industries or tasks/fragments in international production 
chains. The jockeying of a country’s place in a seemingly 
hierarchically organised structure of international produc-
tion and trade relationships has become a prime target of 
trade and industrial policies. Such hierarchies have been 
operationalised in empirical research through rankings in 
terms of capital, skill or R&D intensities, leading to a focus 
in various policy fields to support a country’s move up the 
ladder of such hierarchies. The role of foreign technology 
spillovers and of foreign producers as carriers of such 
spillovers and as supports for access to foreign markets 
has been recognised, and attention has also been paid 
to incentivising the channels through which such spillo-
vers to domestic producers would occur. In all these re-
spects, the three areas of trade policy, FDI policy and 
industrial policy have been seen as highly interrelated 
and complementary in achieving the goal of “climbing up 
the ladder”.
Framework conditions and horizontal vs. vertical inter-
ventions
An old issue in industrial policy is the question of the rela-
tive weights which should be given to so-called horizon-
tal vs. vertical policies. The “specific inputs” approach by 
Hausmann et al. automatically means that the specific re-
quirements of particular activities or of clusters of activi-
ties have to be recognised in formulating policies, either 
horizontal or vertical.16
Rodrik rightly states that
horizontal interventions need to be thought of as a lim-
iting case, and not as a clear-cut alternative, to secto-
ral policies. In practice most interventions, even those 
that are meant to be horizontal, necessarily favor some 
activities over others. . . .Thus, policy makers do not 
have the luxury of neglecting the asymmetric effects 
of their “horizontal” interventions. They need to ensure 
that the activities being ultimately favored are those 
that disproportionately suffer from the market imper-
fections in question.17
Hence, the first issue with regard to the discussion of 
horizontal vs. vertical policies is that the boundary can-
not be easily drawn. Critics of vertical policies would say 
that such policies explicitly discriminate in favour of par-
ticular firms or sectors. However, the above quotation em-
phasises that horizontal policies also impact differently 
on different types of sectors or enterprises, and a well-
informed policy maker should be aware of this. Hence, the 
distinction between explicit or implicit discrimination is 
pretty blurred.
Secondly and more importantly, there remains a crucial 
argument in favour of explicit vertical intervention that has 
to do with coordination failures in a market economy. This 
refers to a situation in which the development of a par-
ticular sector, activity, new product line or technology, or 
a move into a new market segment would take place only 
16 R. Hausmann , D. Rod r i k , C.F. Sabe l : Reconfiguring Industrial 
Policy: A Framework with an Application to South Africa, Harvard Uni-
versity, August 2007
17 See D. Rod r i k , op. cit., p. 6.
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if other firms/actors participate. As no actor can be sure 
that the others will also move, they do not move either. 
Everybody, however, is aware that a joint move would 
generate spillover effects, allow a critical mass of joint 
R&D spending, lead to the training of a joint pool of quali-
fied labour, make it worthwhile to build new infrastructure, 
and allow the joint development and penetration of new 
markets.  The coordinating role of government in such cir-
cumstances is well recognised in the literature and has 
been put into practice on many occasions.
The criticism remains, however, that vertical policy always 
implies that government selects a particular branch of ac-
tivity, technology or particular market niche for support. 
The accusation of “picking winners” is based on the criti-
cism that governments do not have any privileged source 
of information regarding such picking. The answer which 
Hausman and Rodrik, Hausman et al., and Rodrik give to 
this is that industrial policy should not pick ex ante but in 
close interaction with all the possible actors involved (they 
call this strategy “embeddedness”).18 Hence, no supe-
rior information by government agencies is presupposed; 
rather, government should attempt to pool many poten-
tial sources of information, embark on a search process 
and focus on areas where potentially high (social) returns 
could emerge from a range of coordination supports. A 
transparent process of searching and laying down clearly 
stated criteria for decision-making at different nodes of 
this process should also provide a safeguard against cap-
ture by interest groups.
With regard to the use of vertical industrial policy instru-
ments, policy makers face different challenges in ad-
vanced and less advanced economies.
Less advanced economies
In less advanced economies, the main aim is to choose 
a particular path of catching-up, and the choice of ver-
tical policies is in some sense easier, as development 
patterns across stages of industrial developments have 
been well studied.19 This makes the choice of a sequence 
of activities which allows a gradual “climbing up the lad-
der” process to take place more straightforward than in 
the case of advanced economies. The criteria for such a 
choice include an assessment of what is feasible in rela-
tion to factor endowments that are available and could 
be provided within a particular time horizon. Further, the 
strongest learning opportunities need to be determined, 
as do linkage effects to other activities in which further 
18 R. Hausmann , D. Rod r i k , op. cit.; R. Hausmann , D. Rod r i k , 
C.F. Sabe l , op. cit.; D. Rod r i k , op. cit.
19 See the early works of S. Kuznets, H. Chenery and R. Syrquin.
learning and development potentials could be exploited. 
The growth potential criterion explains the strong at-
traction to acquire stakes in high income markets where 
global purchasing power is concentrated. Finally, it is im-
portant to assess which types of firms (in terms of num-
bers, scales and factor recruitment capacity) would most 
likely succeed in overcoming thresholds of market entry 
and embarking on a sustained growth record in the cho-
sen areas of activity.
Advanced economies
In advanced economies, i.e. those close to the technolog-
ical frontier, the future development with regard to new in-
dustrial activities, new products and new technologies is 
untested territory. Advanced economies are on less solid 
ground in assessing which criteria are decisive for suc-
cess. One can only draw on analogies, on the policies that 
worked well in previous technological ventures and in the 
setting up of infrastructure for new activities before that, 
on lessons with respect to appropriate market structures 
to optimise the balance between reaping scale econo-
mies and competitive pressure, etc. It is also difficult to 
foresee the nature of international competition that could 
be encountered: there could be overcrowding in the same 
areas of new technologies, new branches and new prod-
ucts, as countries at similar levels of technological and in-
dustrial development are all driven by similar evaluations 
of the next most important frontier with regard to indus-
trial and technological development. It is important also 
in this context to be aware of a country’s/region’s par-
ticular comparative advantages within the space of next 
generation technologies, products and activities. Such 
comparative advantages are based on the built-up stock 
of skills, infrastructure and public inclinations to support 
one or another type of technology or activity and thus the 
willingness to provide public resources to support the de-
velopment of these.
Apart from the support of new activities, there is also a 
role for vertical policies to influence the nature of an ad-
justment process with regard to old industries that have 
come under acute pressure either from international 
competition (through a changing international division of 
labour) or simply because these are – at a certain stage 
of national or global development – industries with rather 
low growth prospects and/or they require a major over-
haul in terms of product spectrum and techniques used. 
The shift of resources out of old industries, technological 
trajectories and product segments that should be vacat-
ed could encounter lock-in features which serve as exit 
barriers, which require coordination efforts, just as entry 
barriers for new activities do. Hence, here is another role 
for industrial policy.
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Recommendations regarding policy processes and 
procedures
(i) Industrial policy formulation and execution have to take 
place at all levels (regional and sub-regional, national and 
and supra-national).
It is clear from the earlier discussion that industrial policy 
intervention which is directed towards reducing or over-
coming entry barriers, counteracting coordination fail-
ures, and providing public goods will have to take place 
at different levels depending on the scope and space 
where such phenomena take place. This is easy to see in 
the case of public goods provision, where access to dif-
ferent public goods (transport, communications, training 
infrastructure) support different scales and geographic 
scopes. However, it similarly applies to policy designed to 
overcome entry barriers or coordination failures.
There are advantages and disadvantages of policy pro-
cesses conducted at higher or lower levels. At the region-
al or sub-regional levels, the advantages include the eas-
ier involvement of all relevant actors (“embeddedness”) 
in the information-gathering process and the potential to 
cater more precisely to the specific input needs of a par-
ticular region or sub-region or a geographically defined 
cluster of activities. The disadvantages might lie in the 
easier capture of the process of decision-making by pow-
erful local groups and the smaller range of alternatives 
which could be weighed against each other and which 
would provide a yardstick to make sure that the best op-
tion is chosen. Furthermore, the capture might also lead 
to greater intransparency of the process. A counterweight 
could be provided by the involvement of authorities at a 
higher level (national or supra-national) to deliver informa-
tion on comparative projects, to provide standards, to un-
dertake additional evaluations, to supply technical know-
how which would not be available at the regional or sub-
regional level, and to increase the level of transparency by 
publishing cross-regional evaluations, etc.
At the higher (national or supra-national) levels, the prob-
lem of “embeddedness” of the policy process is more 
severe; authorities would have to select which actors to 
involve in the “search process”, which will limit access to 
all relevant information.20 On the other hand, standards 
of evaluation and of execution can be higher, as there is 
more scope for comparison, for the hiring of better exper-
tise and for the cumulative build-up of a knowledge base. 
The respective advantages and disadvantages of the pol-
icy process at higher and lower levels imply that interac-
20 See R. Hausmann , D. Rod r i k , C. Sabe l , op. cit.
tion between the processes at different levels would lead 
to better outcomes.
(ii) What are the risks of government failures? What are the 
challenges for low/medium/high income countries?
It is clear, like in all areas of government intervention, 
that there is the risk of government failure. One reason 
for such failure is that the relationship between govern-
ment and private sector agents is affected by asymmetric 
information, and this can lead to problematic principal-
agent problems. How can government agencies ensure 
that correct and sufficient information is provided so that 
good decisions can be made? Furthermore, how can ef-
fective monitoring of the use of resources and the impact 
of policies be undertaken, and – following from this – how 
can a proper evaluation be conducted? There is no gen-
eral recipe available to deal with these issues. The recom-
mendation by Rodrik et al. is to use a carrot-and-stick ap-
proach to elicit information from private agents in an inter-
active process of searching for an appropriate industrial 
policy framework tailored to the specific situation.21 Clear 
evaluation guidelines for the continuation or discontinu-
ation of support schemes should be worked out, always 
maintaining access for newcomers to such schemes so 
that a competitive bidding process is in place at each 
stage of an industrial policy strategy.
Apart from the issue of asymmetric information, there is 
the problem of rent-seeking bureaucrats as well as rent 
sharing between public authorities and private agents. 
This can be a particularly problematic issue in the case of 
the use of industrial policy instruments, as such arrange-
ments can influence long-term market structures and 
market positions. The capture of public policy-making 
institutions can thus thwart economic structures in the di-
rection of entrenching the position of incumbents and so-
lidify entry barriers. A recent econometric study by the Vi-
enna Institute for International Economic Studies looked 
at the impact of various types of state aid schemes in the 
European Union. One very robust result obtained showed 
that the impact of state aid depends strongly on govern-
ance indicators, deciding in many cases between a posi-
tive and a negative impact.22 Hence, it is clear that the 
emphasis in the development literature on improving the 
quality of governance is very much an issue of whether 
industrial policy can have beneficial impacts.
21 Ibid.
22 See Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw): A 
‘manufacturing imperative’ in the EU – Europe’s position in global 
manufacturing and the role of industrial policy; background study to 
the European Competitiveness Report 2013, DG Enterprise, Vienna 
and Brussels 2013.
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ous; when a recovery arrives, the loss of domestic pro-
duction capacity is likely to result in mounting trade defi-
cits – with the exception of surplus countries such as Ger-
many, Japan and China. Such imbalances will have to be 
compensated by greater capital inflows, a further rise in 
private and public debt, and the risk of financial instability.
International production systems are showing a more 
hierarchical structure. Leading firms increase their oli-
gopolistic market power and control a wider network of 
outsourcing and offshoring activities distributed in an 
increasing number of advanced and emerging market 
economies. At the same time, in their home countries, 
especially in Europe, large firms have downsized produc-
tion capacity, closed plants, and slashed employment; 
additionally, R&D and investment have often been re-
duced. Industrial employment has been hit hardest – even 
in countries with growing output, productivity increases 
mean that there is no net job creation.2
Private investment continues to be negatively affected 
by firms’ expectations of low demand, as world export 
growth has not returned to pre-crisis levels and remains 
important for surplus countries only. Austerity policies 
have prevented an expansion of public investment and 
services, resulting in a prolonging of the stagnation, es-
pecially in Europe. The result is the emergence of a polar-
ised industrial structure – “leaders” are becoming strong-
er, while “weak” countries, regions, industries and firms 
are becoming even weaker.
Five reasons for a new industrial policy
All this is not happening by chance. It is the result of 
the policy decisions of the last thirty years. In advanced 
countries, mainstream economics and neoliberal poli-
cies have imposed the conventional wisdom that “free” 
markets are efficient and capable to drive the long-term 
development of national economies. Policy actions have 
liberalised markets, privatised almost all state-owned 
2 The evolution of European industries in the recession is examined 
by N. Fos t e r-McGrego r, M. Ho l z ne r, M. L andesmann , J. 
Pösch l , R. S t eh re r, R. S t ö l l i n ge r : European Competitiveness 
Report. A ‘Manufacturing imperative’ in the EU – Europe’s position 
in global manufacturing and the role of industrial policy, Vienna 2013, 
wiiw; A. S imonaz z i , A. G i n zbu rg , G. Noce l l a : Economic rela-
tions between Germany and southern Europe, in: Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2013, pp. 653-675; K. A i g i nge r : In-
dustrial Policy for a Sustainable Growth Path, WIFO Working Papers, 
No. 469, 2014.
Mario Pianta*
What Is to Be Produced? The Case for Industrial Policy
The financial crisis of 2008 has had lasting consequences 
on the world economy. Seven years after its start, global 
industrial production is about six per cent higher than in 
2008 – a very modest recovery. Growth is due to emerging 
market economies – China in particular – which, however, 
did not return to the very high growth rates of the pre-cri-
sis years. Among advanced countries, the United States 
has recovered first, showing modest progress compared 
to 2008 levels; Japan is catching up, while Europe has 
lost ground. Within Europe, sharply divergent dynamics 
are found. Comparing major countries in 2013 and 2008, 
only Germany, Austria and the Netherlands returned to 
pre-crisis growth levels and suffered limited slumps. Po-
land alone has shown substantial growth. In 2013 the UK 
and France were 11 per cent below their 2008 levels, and 
similar losses can be found in most countries in Central 
and Northern Europe. Ireland has returned to its pre-crisis 
growth levels only after dramatic losses in the midst of 
the crisis. Southern Europe has lost a major part of its in-
dustrial capacity: one-seventh in Portugal, and about a 
quarter in Italy, Spain and Greece.1 The crisis has led to 
a major destruction of economic activities, dramatic job 
losses and a changed hierarchy of industrial production.
Advanced countries face a structural loss of production 
capacity in industries that were previously the engines 
of growth, while no other fast-growing economic activity 
appears to be able to play a similar role in the future – fi-
nance is overblown and highly unstable, consumer ser-
vices suffer from the slump in demand and the public sec-
tor is being downsized everywhere.
This combination of economic stagnation and industrial 
decline has wide-ranging consequences. As industry los-
es its role as a major source of employment – especially 
for medium-skilled workers – unemployment becomes 
more intractable, wages fall, and inequality and poverty 
rise. External imbalances are likely to become more seri-
* The arguments of this paper were presented at workshops at the Eu-
roMemorandum 2015, EAEPE, wiiw and the Sapienza University of 
Rome. See M. Mazzuca t o , C. An t one l l i , R. Be l l o f i o re , F. Ga r-
i b a l do , A. G i n zbu rg , M. L and i n i , M. P i an t a , M. Lucchese : 
Lo stato innovatore: una discussione, in: Economia e Lavoro, Vol. 48, 
No. 3, 2014. A detailed presentation of the proposals can be found in 
M. P i an t a : An industrial policy for Europe, in: Seoul Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2014, pp. 277-305.
1 Data are from Eurostat, World Bank and UNIDO; see M. P i an t a : An 
industrial policy for Europe, in: Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, 
No. 3, 2014, pp. 277-305; and the article by Valeria Cirillo and Dario 
Guarascio in this issue of Intereconomics.
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by Pianta, Foster-McGregor et al., and Aiginger.6 Mazzu-
cato emphasises the need for a broad role of “transform-
ative” public action in innovation and industrial change.7 
Even mainstream perspectives have paid attention to the 
need for industrial policies.8
Building on such a debate, there are five major reasons 
for developing a new industrial policy, especially in Eu-
rope. The first one is rooted in macroeconomics. Exiting 
the current stagnation requires a substantial increase in 
demand, which could come from an EU-wide investment 
plan driven by public policies.
The second reason is associated with the changes in 
the economic structure resulting from the crisis. Major 
losses are taking place in troubled industries. New large 
economic activities that could offer additional output and 
new jobs are required, whereas the inflated financial sec-
tor needs to be downsized. A new industrial policy could 
drive the rise of new environmentally sustainable, knowl-
edge-intensive, high-skill and high-wage economic ac-
tivities. Specific activities that could be targeted include: 
a) environmental protection, sustainable transportation, 
energy efficiency and renewable energy sources; b) the 
production and dissemination of knowledge, applications 
of ICTs and web-based activities; and c) health, welfare 
and caring activities.
Third, a new industrial policy is needed in order to reverse 
the massive privatisations of past decades. The crisis is 
also the result of the short-term horizons of firms – due 
in large measure to the dominant role played by finance. 
There is a need for substantial action by the public sector 
in setting priorities, investing and creating employment. 
Public action could support the organisation of new mar-
kets, the development of competences and entrepre-
neurship, access to capital, etc.; it could directly produce 
public goods, such as knowledge, environmental quality, 
well-being, social integration and territorial cohesion.
The fourth reason for a new industrial policy is related to 
the regional dimension. A growing divide is emerging in 
Europe – between the “German-centred core” and the 
“Southern periphery”, as pointed out in the article by 
Cirillo and Guarascio in this issue. This leads to deepen-
6 M. P i an t a : Industrial and innovation policies in Europe; in: A. Wa t t , 
A. Bo t sch  (eds.): After the crisis: towards a sustainable growth mod-
el, ETUI, 92-95, Brussels 2010; M. P i an t a : An industrial policy for Eu-
rope … , op. cit.; N. Fos t e r-McGrego r  et al., op. cit.; K. A i g i nge r, 
op. cit.
7 M. Mazzuca t o : The entrepreneurial state, London 2013, Anthem 
Press.
8 P. Agh i on , J. Bou l ange r, E. Cohen : Rethinking industrial policy, 
Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/04, 2011.
firms, opened up trade in goods and services, favoured 
international investments and capital flows, enhanced 
private intellectual property rights, and reduced all forms 
of regulation and labour protection. The article by Cimoli, 
Dosi and Stiglitz (in this Forum) explains the logic of such 
neoliberal policy and the continuing need for industrial 
and innovation policies.3 In fact, industrial policy drove 
Europe’s highly successful expansion from the 1950s to 
the 1970s. Then industrial policy fell out of fashion. Poli-
cies lost their selectivity and were limited to automatic 
“horizontal” mechanisms, such as across-the-board tax 
incentives for R&D or for the acquisition of new machin-
ery. The result has been a general loss of policy influence 
on the direction of industrial change.
The rationale for industrial policy is that it can steer the 
evolution of the economy towards activities that are de-
sirable in economic terms (improving efficiency), in social 
terms (addressing needs and reducing inequality), in en-
vironmental terms (assuring sustainability) and in political 
terms (protecting key national interests). The economic 
rationale includes the search for improvements in static 
and dynamic efficiency, especially in cases of market fail-
ure; in the coordination of decisions; and in the framework 
conditions of economic activities. Gains in dynamic effi-
ciency are the most important argument for industrial pol-
icy. Public policy can expand available resources, favour-
ing the growth of firms and industries that are character-
ised by strong learning processes, technological change, 
productivity increases, scale economies, internationalisa-
tion and rapid demand growth. The resulting benefits in-
clude faster growth of production, incomes, employment 
and competitiveness.
In the aftermath of the crisis of 2008 and of the failure of 
“free markets” to deliver results, a widespread rethink-
ing on the importance of industrial policy is underway. 
In emerging market economies, extensive public poli-
cies have been at the root of industrialisation. Chang and 
Rodrik have provided compelling arguments on the need 
for industrial policy.4 Its relevance for emerging econo-
mies is discussed by Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz and by 
Stiglitz and Lin Yifu.5 The European context is examined 
3 See also H.-J. Chang : The political economy of industrial policy, 
Basingstoke 1994, Macmillan; M. C imo l i , G. Dos i , J. S t i g l i t z 
(eds.): Industrial policy and development, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2009; J. S t i g l i t z , J. L i n  Y i f u  (eds.): The industrial policy 
revolution I. The role of government beyond ideology, Basingstoke 
2013, Palgrave Macmillan.
4 H.-J. Chang , op. cit.; D. Rod r i k : Normalizing industrial policy, The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World 
Bank, Commission on Growth and Development, Working Paper, 
No. 3, 2008.
5 M. C imo l i , G. Dos i , J. S t i g l i t z , op. cit.; J. S t i g l i t z , J. L i n  Y i f u 
(eds.), op. cit.
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Again, the recession has rolled back advances in periph-
ery countries.
The strategy includes a set of indicators from the 20/20/20 
climate/energy targets established in 2009 by the Eu-
ropean Council. The first one is a 20 per cent reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 from the levels of 
1990 (30 per cent “if the conditions are right”). In 2009 the 
level of emissions declined by 17 per cent, largely due to 
the fall in output. The second target is a rise in the share 
of EU energy consumption produced from renewable re-
sources to 20 per cent (in 2008 it was 10.3 per cent). The 
third target is a 20 per cent rise in energy efficiency. The 
two flagship initiatives devoted by Europe 2020 to inno-
vation and industrial policy are the “Innovation Union”10 
and “An integrated industrial policy for the globalization 
era”11. As in the Lisbon Agenda, industrial policy is based 
on a horizontal approach, where the main policy tools are 
the provision of infrastructure, the reduction of transac-
tion costs across the EU, a more appropriate regulatory 
framework favouring competition, and access to finance. 
This strategy confirms the EU’s rejection of targeted in-
dustrial policies and state action for developing particular 
activities, a stance that first emerged in the 1980s.
Since the start of the crisis, the focus on austerity policies 
has sidelined any serious discussion on industrial policy. 
Still, the severity of industrial decline led the European 
Commission in January 2014 to introduce a new policy 
initiative called the Industrial Compact, which established 
the target of returning industrial activities to 20 per cent of 
GDP by 2020, against the present 16 per cent.12 German 
and, to a lesser extent, Italian industry and governments 
lobbied for such action, which remains entirely within the 
Europe 2020 approach described above.
More importantly, in late 2014 the Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker launched the Investment Plan for 
Europe, promising new investment projects valued at 
€315 billion. While €8 billion of new EU funds were prom-
ised, by April 2015 the European Commission had found 
only €2 billion – from previous budget lines. The EU guar-
antee on the projects was expected to bring in an addi-
tional €8 billion, and the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
was expected to contribute €5 billion. This total of €21 bil-
lion was expected to mobilise private funds to contribute 
an amount 15 times greater, relying on a huge leverage ef-
fect in financial markets based on expectations of high re-
10 European Commission: Innovation Union, COM (2010) 546, Brussels 
2010.
11 European Commission: An integrated industrial policy for the globali-
zation era, COM (2010) 614, Brussels 2010.
12 European Commission: For a European Industrial Renaissance, COM 
(2014) 14/2, Brussels 2014.
ing imbalances that could be effectively reduced by a new 
industrial policy.
Fifth, a new industrial policy could become a major tool 
for addressing the urgent need for an ecological trans-
formation. Making advanced economies sustainable – re-
ducing the use of non-renewable resources, developing 
renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, protect-
ing ecological systems and landscapes, lowering CO2 
and other greenhouse gas emissions, reducing waste and 
recycling – goes well beyond the emergence of specific 
environmentally friendly new activities. It is a transforma-
tion that concerns the whole economy and all of socie-
ty. A combination is needed of direct public action, with 
the provision of environmental services, and appropriate 
regulations for private activities, including environmental 
taxation, incentives, public procurement and organisation 
of new markets. A new industrial policy could provide the 
framework for integrating the different policy tools need-
ed for making economies sustainable.
Industrial policy can be an important and flexible tool for 
addressing all these priorities. Could Europe be the agent 
of such policy novelty?
Europe’s missing industrial policy
European Union policies on the evolution of economic ac-
tivities are now framed in the Europe 2020 strategy, ap-
proved in June 2010 by the European Council. Three pri-
orities are identified: “smart growth” – an economy based 
on knowledge and innovation; “sustainable growth” – a 
resource-efficient, greener and more competitive econo-
my; and “inclusive growth” – a high-employment econo-
my with social and territorial cohesion. By 2020 the EU 
is expected to reach five headline targets, and eight flag-
ship initiatives are associated to priority themes for reviv-
ing Europe’s growth.9 The specific targets identified by 
Europe 2020 follow the footsteps of the Lisbon Agenda. 
The target of devoting three per cent of EU GDP to R&D 
expenditure is maintained. In 2008, R&D spending in the 
EU27 amounted to 2.1 per cent, with a highly uneven dis-
tribution across countries and no sign of convergence. 
Since then, the recession has led to falling expenditures 
and even greater disparities. Innovation capacity should 
be supported by the formation of human capital – the 
share of early school leavers should be under ten per 
cent in 2020 (it was 14.4 per cent in 2009 in the EU27), 
and at least 40 per cent of the younger generation should 
have a tertiary degree (32.2 per cent in 2009 in the EU27). 
9 European Commission: Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth, COM (2010) 2020 final, Brussels 2010.
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of demand and productivity. This would include activities 
centred on the environment and energy, knowledge and 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), and 
health and welfare.
Environment and energy. The current industrial model 
has to be deeply transformed in the direction of environ-
mental sustainability. The technological paradigm of the 
future could be based on “green” products, processes 
and social organisations that use much less energy, re-
sources and land; have a much lighter effect on climate 
and ecosystems; move to renewable energy sources; or-
ganise transport systems that transcend the dominance 
of cars via integrated mobility systems; rely on the repair 
and maintenance of existing goods and infrastructures; 
and protect nature and the Earth. Such a perspective 
raises enormous opportunities for research, innovation, 
and new economic and social activities. A new set of co-
herent policies should address these complex, long-term 
challenges.
Knowledge and ICTs. Current change is dominated by 
the diffusion throughout the economy of the paradigm 
based on ICTs. Its potential for wider applications, higher 
productivity and lower prices, and new goods and social 
benefits should be supported. However, ICTs and web-
based activities are reshaping the boundaries between 
the economic and social spheres, as the success of open 
source software, copyleft, Wikipedia and peer-to-peer 
activities clearly show. Policies should encourage the 
practice of innovation as a social, cooperative and open 
process, easing the rules on the access and sharing of 
knowledge, rather than enforcing and restricting the intel-
lectual property rules designed for a previous technologi-
cal era.
Health and welfare. Europe is an ageing continent with the 
best health systems in the world, rooted in their nature as 
public services separate from the private market. Advanc-
es in care systems, instrumentation, biotechnologies, ge-
netics and drug research have to be supported and regu-
lated considering their ethical and social consequences 
(as in the cases of GMOs, cloning, access to drugs in de-
veloping countries, etc.). Social innovation may spread in 
welfare services with a greater role for citizens, users and 
non-profit organisations, renewed public provision, and 
new forms of self-organisation of communities.
All these fields are characterised by labour-intensive pro-
duction processes and by the requirement of medium to 
high skills, giving them the potential to provide “good” 
jobs. But how could individual countries – and Europe as 
a whole – change their economic activities in such direc-
tions?
turns on investment. However, national funds committed 
to the projects have been limited – €8 billion each from 
Germany, France and Italy – and have been constrained 
to domestic investment. Interestingly, member states 
have so far proposed 1,300 projects costing a total of €2 
trillion. This shows the great need for public investment 
in EU countries and the huge mismatch between current 
policies and available resources.
Finally, an additional policy development in Europe 
emerged in 2013 with the negotiations for the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the 
United States. TTIP would move Europe further down the 
road of trade liberalisation – the very process that has led 
to a more polarised industrial structure. More importantly, 
it would offer very strong protection for private foreign in-
vestment and scale back the scope for public policy and 
regulation in major fields, including environmental rules, 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), utilities and other 
public services.13 TTIP has come under increasing criti-
cism, and its future is uncertain. If it were approved, the 
scope for a European industrial policy would definitely be 
restricted, and the space for public action in the economy 
would be reduced to a minimum.
How can we change what is produced?
A different policy perspective is needed, one that ad-
dresses the joint needs to end the depression, fund the 
necessary public investment and rebuild sustainable eco-
nomic activities. Decisions on the future of the industrial 
structure have to be brought back into the public domain. 
A new generation of industrial policies has to overcome 
the limitations and failures of past experiences – such 
as collusive practices between political and economic 
power, heavy bureaucracy, and lack of accountability and 
entrepreneurship. They should be creative and selective, 
with mechanisms of decision making based on the priori-
ties for using public resources that are more democratic, 
inclusive of different social interests, and open to civil so-
ciety and trade union voices.
The general principles of industrial policy are simple 
enough. It should favour the evolution of knowledge, 
technologies and economic activities in directions that 
improve economic performances, social conditions and 
environmental sustainability. It should favour activities 
and industries characterised by learning processes – by 
individuals and in organisations – rapid technological 
change, scale and scope economies, and strong growth 
13 See the critical review in EuroMemo Group: EuroMemorandum 2015. 
What future for the European Union – Stagnation and polarisation or 
new foundations?, 2015.
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argue that an ambitious but realistic proposal could be 
developed on the basis of the following institutions, gov-
ernance mechanisms and funding arrangements.
The institutional arrangements. Individual EU countries 
are too small to develop an industrial policy that could 
be effective in the current context of globalisation. The 
new industrial policy has to be set within the European 
Union or at least the eurozone. This is needed in order 
to coordinate industrial policy with macroeconomic, mon-
etary, fiscal, trade, competition and other EU-wide poli-
cies. Changes are required in current EU regulations, in 
particular the ones that prevent public action from “dis-
torting” the operation of markets. As this policy is likely 
to meet opposition by some EU countries, a “variable-
geometry” EU policy could be envisaged, excluding the 
countries that do not wish to participate.
Close integration has to be developed among the Euro-
pean, national and local dimensions. Existing institutions 
could be integrated in such a new industrial policy, includ-
ing – at the EU level – Structural Funds and the EIB. How-
ever, their mode of operation should be adapted to the 
different requirements of the role proposed here. While 
adapting existing institutions is the most effective way to 
proceed in the short term, in the longer term there is a 
need for a dedicated institution – either a European Public 
Investment Bank or a European Industrial Agency – co-
herent with the mandate of reshaping economic activities 
in Europe.
A system could be envisaged in which EU governments 
and the European Parliament agree on the guidelines and 
funding of industrial policy, calling upon the European 
Commission to implement appropriate policy tools and 
spending mechanisms. In each country a specific institu-
tion – either an existing or a new one, such as a National 
Public Investment Bank – could assume the role of co-
ordinating the implementation of industrial policies at the 
national level, interacting with the existing national inno-
vation system, policy actors, the financial sector, etc. The 
institutions at the national and local levels would take re-
sponsibility for spending decisions, identifying the private 
firms to be supported (either with low interest loans or 
with a share of ownership), the projects to be developed 
and the new public activities that are required. These in-
stitutions would be subject to the strict monitoring de-
scribed below.
The funding of industrial policy. Funds for an EU-wide in-
dustrial policy should come from EU-wide resources. It is 
essential that troubled national public budgets would not 
be burdened with the need to provide additional resourc-
es and that national public debt would not be increased. 
Industrial policy has long relied on different mecha-
nisms. On the supply side, public funds have supported 
selected R&D, innovation and investment efforts. Public 
investment banks and public enterprises have supported 
business start-ups in key fields with credits and venture 
capital and have managed the restructuring of major pro-
duction activities. Public, community and cooperative en-
terprises have a role in fields – such as knowledge-based 
activities and environmental and local services – where 
public goods and public procurement are prevalent.
On the demand side, far-sighted public procurement, the 
organisation and regulation of markets with high growth 
potential, and support and incentives for early users of 
new technologies have helped “pull” innovation and in-
vestment through “mission-oriented” policies.14 In Europe 
the diffusion of wind and solar energy is the result of the 
use of such instruments. In fewer cases, policies have 
“empowered the users”, letting them define specific ap-
plications of existing technologies that may lead to new 
goods and services with large markets. Finally, policies 
have aimed at building closer relationships among all 
actors of national and European systems of innovation 
– firms, financial institutions, universities and policy mak-
ers – helping to coordinate decisions of public and private 
actors. The funding for such policies has generally come 
from national public expenditures, but fiscal austerity has 
now dried up this option.
A proposal for a new EU-wide industrial policy
The need for rebuilding and restructuring economic activi-
ties in Europe has recently led to several policy proposals. 
The German trade union confederation DGB proposed “A 
Marshall Plan for Europe”, envisaging a public investment 
plan of the magnitude of two per cent of Europe’s GDP 
per year over ten years.15 Along the same lines, the Euro-
pean Trade Union Confederation proposed “A new path 
for Europe”.16 European Greens proposed a similar plan 
for a sustainable Europe.17 Building on such ideas, we can 
14 See M. Mazzuca t o , op. cit.
15 DGB: A Marshall Plan for Europe: Proposal by the DGB for an eco-
nomic stimulus, investment and development programme for Europe, 
2012.
16 European Trade Union Confederation: A new path for Europe: ETUC 
plan for investment, sustainable growth and quality jobs, 7 November 
2013.
17 The Greens: European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. A 
Green Investment Plan for Europe, Brussels 2014. Previous work ad-
vancing such arguments include M. P i an t a : Industrial and innova-
tion policies in Europe … , op. cit.; M. P i an t a : An industrial policy 
for Europe … , op. cit.; M. P i an t a , M. Lucchese : Industrial and in-
novation policies in the European Union; in: F. Ga r i b a l do , M. Ba -
g l i o n i , V. Te l l j o hann , C. Casey  (eds.): Workers, Citizens, Gov-
ernance: Socio-Cultural Innovation at Work, Berlin 2012, Peter Lang; 
EuroMemo Group, op. cit.
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ties, such as the provision of public capital for new ac-
tivities in emerging sectors.
• Public support could stimulate financial markets to in-
vest in private firms and non-profit organisations de-
veloping market activities that could more easily repay 
the investment.
In all cases, the rationale for financing industrial policy 
cannot be reduced to the financial logic of the return on 
investment.
The governance system. The European institution in 
charge of industrial policy – possibly a European Public 
Investment Bank – should be accountable to the Euro-
pean Parliament, which could appoint its board with rep-
resentatives from business, research organisations, trade 
unions and environmental civil society organisations. No 
“revolving door” between industrial policy institutions and 
private firms and banks should be allowed. The European 
institution should engage in consultation with EU politi-
cal, economic and social actors to develop its proposed 
industrial policy, which should be approved by the Euro-
pean Parliament. Funds could then be assigned to nation-
al institutions and specific targets – within the economic 
activities outlined above – and could be used in order to:
• fund, through loans or minority ownership, enterprises 
– including new start-up firms – operating in high-risk, 
high-innovation fields relevant for such policy priori-
ties; the shares could then be sold if the firms are suc-
cessful and attract private finance;
• fund procurement programmes for innovative prod-
ucts relevant for public services and growing markets;
• fund R&D in universities, and public and private institu-
tions;
• fund innovation and its diffusion in private and public 
organisations;
• fund and organise networks of innovators, producers 
and users in new activities, in order to consolidate eco-
nomic relationships and create markets;
• continue to provide horizontal support to firms with the 
existing policy instruments.
The lessons from similar successful experiences outside 
Europe, such as ARPA-E in the US or the Brazilian De-
velopment Bank BNDES, are discussed by Mazzucato.19 
19 M. Mazzuca t o , op. cit.
The order of magnitude of the funding for the industrial 
policy programme outlined above is about two per cent 
of EU GDP over a period of ten years (that is, about €260 
billion per year), as suggested by the DGB, the ETUC 
and the Greens. As terms of reference, we can note that 
the European Central Bank (ECB) started its quantitative 
easing programme in March 2015, through which it will 
purchase €60 billion of bonds per month until September 
2016. EU Structural Funds in the period 2007-13 reached 
€347 billion. Annual lending by the EIB is €65 to €70 bil-
lion. An investment effort of about two per cent of EU 
GDP appears therefore to be feasible – considering the 
size and power of European institutions. It would be ade-
quate to fund all the projects proposed under the Juncker 
Plan, and it would be big enough to compensate for the 
lack of investment – still 17 per cent below the pre-crisis 
level – and effectively end Europe’s stagnation.
Different funding arrangements could be envisaged. The 
most viable one in the short term is the emission of EIB 
bonds that could be bought by the ECB with funds from 
its quantitative easing programme. A similar proposal 
for funding was made by Greek Finance Minister Yanis 
Varoufakis at the Cernobbio and INET conferences in 
April 2015. For eurozone countries, a variety of other ar-
rangements are possible. For example, the emission of 
Eurobonds could fund industrial policy, a new European 
Public Investment Bank could borrow funds directly from 
the ECB or the ECB could directly provide funds for in-
dustrial policy to the relevant spending agencies.
The DGB proposal suggests that funds could be raised 
on financial markets by a new European Public Agency 
and that funds could come from the EU-wide receipts of 
a one-time wealth tax and from the newly introduced fi-
nancial transactions tax.18 Such tax income could help to 
cover interest payments for the necessary projects that 
are not profitable in market terms. An alternative may 
come from deeper European tax reform, introducing an 
EU-wide tax on corporations, thus effectively eliminating 
fiscal competition among EU countries.
Finally, funding arrangements could be different accord-
ing to the relevance of the “public” dimension:
• The priority of public funds should go to public invest-
ment in non-market activities – such as public goods 
provision, infrastructure, knowledge, education and 
health.
• Public funds and long-term private investment should 
be combined in funding new “strategic” market activi-
18 DGB, op. cit.
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of such countries. Another 25 per cent could go to the 
poorer regions of the countries of the “centre”.
These criteria may contribute to overcoming the collu-
sion between industrial policy and economic and political 
power that has characterised past European and national 
experiences. Opening a debate on industrial policy is an 
urgent task. The political obstacles are indeed enormous, 
but a new industrial policy could help to end stagnation, 
provide new high-wage jobs and social cohesion, and of-
fer progress towards an ecological transformation and a 
more effective democracy.
Transparency in decisions would be required, and moni-
toring and evaluation procedures – similar to those re-
quired by EU Structural Funds – should be arranged.
In order to reduce the scope for “pork barrel politics”, the 
countries and regions where such investments could be 
carried out have to be defined in advance, with the explicit 
aim to reduce the polarisation that is weakening the in-
dustrial base of Europe. For instance, 75 per cent of funds 
could go to activities located in periphery countries (East-
ern and Southern Europe, plus Ireland), and at least 50 
per cent of these should be devoted to the poorer regions 
Rainer Walz
Green Industrial Policy in Europe
One lesson of the financial crisis has been that coun-
tries with higher shares of industry in their GDP seemed 
to be less affected by the crisis. Consequently, the call 
for an industrial renaissance has become stronger. This 
development has also changed the industrial policy dis-
course: after years of dominance of a more laissez-faire 
approach,1 economists have started to look into selec-
tive industrial policies again. However, this debate is not 
just a revival of the old concepts about sector-specific 
policies or of the lessons to be learned from the rapid 
catch-up of Asian countries. One significant difference 
is that industrial policies are also becoming aligned with 
approaches for tackling global challenges. Most prom-
inent for this new trend is the case of green industrial 
policy.
 
The background to green industrial policy
The last few years have seen publications and reports 
dealing specifically with green industrial policy. Widely 
circulating policy papers on industrial policy, such as 
from the OECD, very often include sections on industrial 
policy fostering a green economy, and publications by 
1 See for example G. Owen : Industrial Policy in Europe since the Sec-
ond World War: What has been learnt?, ECIPE Occasional Paper 
No. 1/2012, Brussels.
renowned scholars have taken up the issue.2 Within the 
European Union, the policy debate focuses on the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
The Europe 2020 strategy was launched not only to over-
come the financial crisis but also to address long-term 
challenges, among them pressure on resources and en-
vironmental concerns.
Among the seven flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 
strategy, there are three with specific importance for 
green industrial policy. The flagship initiative “Innovation 
Union” calls for increasing R&D spending and improving 
innovation efficiency. It defines a more strategic approach 
to innovation as an important area of action, committing 
explicitly to developing an Eco-innovation Action Plan 
(EcoAP). The flagship initiative on a “Resource-efficient 
Europe” aims to support the shift towards a resource-effi-
cient and low-carbon economy. It also links increasing re-
source efficiency to securing growth and jobs for Europe 
by stimulating innovation, improving competitiveness and 
opening new export markets. The flagship initiative on 
“Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era: Put-
ting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage” 
underlines the importance of a strong manufacturing val-
2 See for example K. Wa rw i c k : Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Is-
sues and New Trends, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Poli-
cy Papers, No. 2, OECD Publishing, 2013; D. Rod r i k : Green Industri-
al Policy, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2014, pp. 
469-491; and K. A i g i nge r : Industrial Policy for a Sustainable Growth 
Path, Policy Paper No. 13, WIFO, Vienna, June 2014.
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ue chain for the EU. It draws attention to a radically chang-
ing global business environment, one with globalising 
value chains and in which emerging economies are rapidly 
catching up. It calls for an integrated approach and for us-
ing strategic intelligence such as impact assessments and 
insights into sectoral innovation performance. Recently, 
the European Commission reiterated the need to link in-
dustrial strategy to fields important for a green economy.3
The term industrial policy can be defined either narrow-
ly or more widely.4 In a wider definition, industrial policy 
strives to improve the environment for business or alter 
the structure of economic activity towards sectors, tech-
nologies and tasks which offer better prospects for eco-
nomic growth and social welfare. The above-mentioned 
European documents implicitly use such a wider defini-
tion: they express the ambition that a green industrial 
policy should foster both better prospects for economic 
growth while at the same time contributing to the achieve-
ment of environmental goals.
Among the various publications, the term “green” is very 
often narrowed down to “climate-friendly”. Indeed, many 
publications on green industrial policy very often deal 
only with energy-related aspects. While tackling climate 
change and reducing energy-related greenhouse gases 
certainly is an important green topic, the implications of 
the greening of industrial policy go beyond such a narrow 
definition. A transition to a green economy affects many 
different sectors. From a technological perspective, a de-
lineation of green technologies yields green energy sup-
ply and energy efficiency, but also green transportation, 
waste and material efficiency technologies, and water-re-
lated technologies.5 Green industrial policy, however, also 
requires strategies through which new technologies are 
complemented by organisational and institutional chang-
es. Furthermore, terms such as sustainable production 
and consumption patterns as well as the transitions of 
sectors are also important goals for achieving a green 
economy. They signal that green industrial policy not only 
concerns technologies but also encompasses changing 
sectors and tasks.
The rationale for green industrial policy
A lot of the debate about industrial policy focuses on the 
rationale for such a policy. Market failures are widely ac-
3 European Commission: For a European Industrial Renaissance, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions, COM(2014) 014 final.
4 K. Wa rw i c k , op. cit.
5 R. Wa l z , W. E i chhamme r : Benchmarking green innovation, in: 
Journal of Mineral Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2012, pp. 79-101.
cepted with regard to knowledge spillovers, which form 
a justification for supporting R&D on a horizontal, non-
technology-specific basis. In addition, however, green in-
dustrial policies favour environmentally friendly solutions 
which reduce environmental pressure. As long as envi-
ronmental costs are externalised, this advantage does 
not show up in the economics of the technology choice. 
As long as perfect internalisation of external costs – the 
cornerstone of neoclassical environmental economics – 
cannot be achieved, there is a need for “second-best” 
policies. Thus, it is not only the externality of research, but 
also the environmental externalities which lead to a widely 
acknowledged double regulatory challenge for green in-
novation.6
Despite the call for deregulation and liberalisation, it is 
still acknowledged – even by neoclassical economists 
– that monopolistic bottlenecks should be regulated. 
Sectors such as electricity, gas, water supply and sew-
age treatment, and railways, all of which are central to 
a green industrial policy, are linked to monopolistic bot-
tlenecks in the form of infrastructure systems with physi-
cal networks. Furthermore, even potentially competitive 
market segments, in general, require access to the sec-
tors with monopolistic bottlenecks, e.g. electricity from 
renewable energy sources produced by new independ-
ent power producers. As the monopolistic market power 
within these sectors can be carried over to the potentially 
competitive stages either by excessive charges for ac-
cess to the infrastructure or by hindering or even fore-
closing the downstream market to competitors, there is 
no level playing field between incumbents and newcom-
ers. Therefore, many green technologies face a triple reg-
ulatory challenge,7 which extends the rationale for green 
industrial policy towards the arena of economic sector 
regulation. 
The rationale for industrial policy can also be analysed 
from a systems perspective, which moves beyond the 
classical market failures framework and draws on evo-
lutionary economic concepts. An argument similar to 
the infant industry model from development econom-
ics can be brought forward with regard to new “green” 
technologies versus old “dirty” technologies. Without 
reaching economies of scale and learning in the market, 
it is argued, new solutions are not able to achieve cost 
reductions in order to compete with older solutions. In the 
context of evolutionary economics, this argument is fur-
6 K. Renn i ngs : Redefining innovation – eco-innovation research and 
the contribution from ecological economics, in: Ecological Econom-
ics, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2000, pp. 319-332.
7 R. Wa l z: The role of regulation for sustainable infrastructure inno-
vations: the case of wind energy, in: International Journal of Public 
Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1/2, 2007, pp. 57-88.
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ther supported by co-evolutionary processes of organi-
sations and institutions. The innovation process along a 
technological trajectory is embedded in the production 
of knowledge and the socioeconomic development of 
institutions.8 However, the co-evolution between technol-
ogy and the surrounding institutions along a technologi-
cal trajectory can also increase path dependency. A new 
technology has not only to compete against a traditional 
one but also against a system consisting of a traditional 
technology together with institutions which have been co-
evolving around this technology. This can result in a lock-
in situation which prevents shifts towards new solutions.9 
Overcoming such path dependencies and lock-in situa-
tions are another rationale for green industrial policies.
There are additional specificities which make path de-
pendency a particular problem for green technologies. 
A lot of the technologies in the energy, water and trans-
portation sectors are characterised by very long lifetimes. 
Thus, the high asset durability limits the opportunities for 
reinvestments. Furthermore, the investments in supply 
technologies tend to be very capital-intensive. Thus, it 
would be very costly to substitute environmentally inten-
sive technologies before the previous investments reach 
the end of their useful lives. Both factors support “tech-
nical path dependency”. The dependency on a grid also 
leads to another kind of path dependency: the grid struc-
ture is optimised towards existing technologies. If green 
solutions require a different grid structure, they cannot 
increase their market share unless they are supported by 
major investments in a new grid structure. The problem is 
increased further if the grid operators and investors have 
specific interests in keeping the traditional structure intact 
and if the regulation of the infrastructure is not pushing 
them in that direction.
 
Policy orientation
Traditionally, a major debate about the orientation of in-
dustrial policy has been related to horizontal policies 
versus selective policies, which support specific sectors 
and technologies. Given the goals and rationale of green 
industrial policy, it can be argued that the policies have 
to be selective to a certain extent, as they are targeted 
at substituting “dirty” technologies by “clean” ones. The 
specific rationale and characteristics of green indus-
trial policy also provide arguments in favour of selective 
policies. First, as outlined above, path dependency is a 
8 G. Dos i : Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. A 
suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of techni-
cal change, in: Research Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1982, pp. 147-162.
9 G.C. Un r uh : Understanding carbon lock-in, in: Energy Policy, Vol. 28, 
No. 12, 2000, pp. 817-830.
very pressing problem, and it calls for specific support, 
especially of new solutions and systems change. Sec-
ondly, first-best solutions, which could alleviate market 
failures, are very often not feasible for political reasons. 
For example, a horizontal policy such as a uniform carbon 
tax, which would alleviate the externality of carbon emis-
sions, would require tax rates close to the external costs, 
which are estimated to be very high. However, a CO2 tax 
in this order of magnitude is currently not feasible for po-
litical reasons. Therefore, second-best policies are need-
ed which focus on a smaller segment, such as enabling 
green technologies to become more cost competitive. 
Thus, typical selective policy instruments such as finan-
cial subsidies and selective technology funding have to 
be used. Thirdly, the sectors targeted by green industrial 
policies are very often already subject to economic sector 
regulation. Indeed, instruments such as price regulation 
are not only a typical instrument for selective green indus-
trial policies but also a traditional element of regulation of 
infrastructure sectors.
The use of selective policy instruments is very often criti-
cised with the argument that governments are ill-suited 
for picking winners. However, it is also argued that it is 
more important to enable learning by government.10 This 
requires the coordination of government policy with busi-
ness strategies, monitoring and evaluations, as well as 
the substitution of smart instrument designs for policies 
which lead to unsatisfactory results. Another challenge 
of industrial policy is that diversity in technological solu-
tions is fostered to prevent lock-in into a limited number 
of technologies. However, preventing such lock-ins is 
not necessarily equivalent to using horizontal instead of 
selective policies. Indeed, in some instances a selective 
policy is necessary to prevent such lock-ins.
The German case of feed-in tariffs for photovoltaics (PV) 
is a good example of the need for both selective policies, 
in order to ensure diversity, and policy learning. Technol-
ogy-specific feed-in tariffs have been criticised for not 
being technology-neutral, i.e. for being too selective, and 
uniform tradable quotas have been suggested as an al-
ternative. However, if a uniform tradable quota for renew-
able energy had been chosen instead of feed-in tariffs, 
the policy would have had almost no effect on bringing PV 
to the market, because PV was very far away from being 
cost competitive with other renewable energy sources. 
Thus, opting for a uniform quota system would have been 
equivalent to letting government implicitly pick a win-
ner, and it would have led to lock-in into few renewable 
energy technologies. In contrast, technology-specific 
feed-in tariffs enabled PV to become a viable alternative, 
10 D. Rod r i k , op. cit.
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increasing the diversity of realistic renewable energy op-
tions. However, cost reductions for PV modules began 
to outpace the reduction of the feed-in tariffs, resulting 
in an installation boom, which ultimately led to a large 
increase in the costs of the policy. Clearly there was a 
need for policy learning. Government first reacted by re-
ducing feed-in tariffs on a case-by-case basis. It then 
introduced smarter policy designs which automatically 
link feed-in tariffs to the target level of technology diffu-
sion. To sum up, there will always be mistakes in apply-
ing selective green industrial policies, but the important 
issue is that policy makers are able to learn and to quick-
ly correct these mistakes. A key prerequisite for doing so 
is strategic intelligence with regard to markets and cost 
development.
The strategic orientation of industrial policy distinguish-
es between the development of comparative advantage 
and comparative advantage-following policies.11 The first 
seeks to develop strategic advantage in new areas, while 
the second aims at consolidating current strengths. Fig-
ure 1 shows that Europe is clearly the world’s leading re-
gion with regard to green patents.12 Even if one discounts 
11 K. Wa rw i c k , op. cit.
12 The concept for identifying patents and export classification is de-
scribed in R. Wa l z , J. Köh l e r : Using lead market factors to assess 
the potential for a sustainability transition, in: Environmental Innova-
tion and Societal Transitions, Vol. 10, March 2014, pp. 20-41. 
intra-EU trade, Europe remains the leader in exports of 
potentially green technologies, albeit with a less clear 
advantage. Figure 2 shows the specialisation profile for 
both patents and exports. Like Japan, the EU27 exhib-
its a positive specialisation for both patents and exports 
to non-EU countries. The other major competitors show 
negative specialisations with regard to patents. Thus, the 
EU27 certainly is among the global leaders and shows 
comparative advantages in the field of green technolo-
gies.
However, the picture looks more heterogeneous if one 
disaggregates the green technologies into five broad 
technology domains (see Table 1) and even more so if 
one moves towards the level of single technology classes, 
such as wind turbines or PV. The EU27 accounts for about 
60 per cent of annual wind turbine patents, representing 
a relative patent activity (RPA) score of 54, but only for 25 
per cent of annual PV patents (an RPA of -27). Thus, no-
body should be surprised if the same industrial policy that 
was applied to the wind turbine industry in Europe leads 
to different results if applied to the PV industry. Clearly, 
there is a need for strategic positioning that takes com-
parative advantages into account when designing green 
industrial policy. However, this requires the build-up of 
strategic intelligence with regard to the factors relevant 
for building a lead market and lead supplier position and 
for the diffusion of this knowledge to the policy debate in 
Figure 1
Green technology shares of major technology 
supplier countries, 2011-12
Figure 2
Green technology specialisation profile of major 
technology supplier countries, 2011-12
No te :  Intra-EU trade is excluded.
Sou rces : AUN COMTRADE, PATSTAT, calculation by Fraunhofer ISI.
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Green 
technology 
domain
EU27 patent 
share
EU27 export 
share*
EU27 RPA EU27 RXA*
Waste & 
recycling
40.0% 33.5% 18.0 55.0
Green energy 
supply
39.9% 29.1% 17.8 47.1
Energy 
efficiency
37.3% 20.5% 11.0 15.6
Green 
transport
39.1% 13.3% 15.8 -26.9
Water 32.6% 32.3% -2.3 54.7
the specific policy arenas.13 The EU certainly has room for 
improvement in this area.
 
Instruments and stringency of EU green industrial 
policy
The portfolio of instruments that the EU uses for green in-
dustrial policy is broad. The first important pillar is funding 
of R&D and innovation. In the past, the EU has funded re-
search and demonstration projects on clean technologies 
in the various framework programmes, in programmes 
such as the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme, or under the Environmental and Climate 
Change sub-programmes of the LIFE+ programmes. 
Horizon 2020 will be the major programme for R&D fund-
ing in 2014-2020.14 Within Horizon 2020, topics related to 
green industrial policy are funded within the section on 
societal challenges. The environment sub-section focus-
es on water, waste and resources. Energy and transport 
issues form separate subsections, while bioeconomy is 
part of the food sub-section. Thus, most of the technolo-
13 R. Wa l z , J. Köh l e r, op. cit., identifies domestic market factors on 
the demand side, market factors on the supply side, innovation-
friendly regulation in the country, the technological capability of the 
country, and the structure of actors and competitiveness of related 
industry clusters in the country as the main factors for achieving a 
lead market and lead supplier position.
14 For the debate about Horizon 2020, see the Intereconomics Forum 
R. Veuge l e r s , M. C i nce r a , R. F r i e t s ch , T. Schube r t , C. Ram-
me r,  A. Pe l l e , J. L e i j t e n , C. Mon t a l vo , A. Renda : The Impact 
of Horizon 2020 on Innovation in Europe, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 50, 
No. 1, 2015, pp. 4-30.
gies and sectors which form the core of green industrial 
policies are covered by Horizon 2020.
A second pillar of EU policies consists of the EU Struc-
tural and Investments Funds. An increasing number of 
“green” projects have been introduced over the past 20 
years within the Structural Funds. However, there is no 
comprehensive evaluation of what has been achieved 
yet with regard to the greening of industrial policy. With 
the adoption of the new multiannual financial framework 
2014-2020, at least €100 billion of European Structural 
and Investment Funds are available to finance investment 
in innovation, in line with industrial policy priorities. The 
Commission’s Communication on “Industrial Renais-
sance” points out that the priorities should be set accord-
ing to “smart specialisation”.15 With bio-based products, 
clean vehicles and vessels, sustainable construction and 
raw materials, and smart grids, four of the six topics pri-
oritised by the Commission in the Industrial Renaissance 
Communication touch directly upon green industrial poli-
cies. Given the specialisation pattern of Europe with re-
gard to green technologies, there should be substantial 
potential for projects in these topics which fit the “smart 
specialisation” logic. However, it will have to be seen how 
much of the 2014-2020 budget will indeed go to “green” 
projects.
The EU has also put considerable effort into fostering 
coordination among actors and stakeholders. European 
Innovation Partnerships (EIP) aim at bringing together 
all relevant actors in order to step up research and de-
velopment efforts, to coordinate investments in demon-
stration and pilot projects, to anticipate and fast-track 
necessary regulation and standards, and to coordinate 
the supply and demand sides. In particular, the EIPs on 
water, smart cities and raw materials have strong links 
to green industrial policy. Within the energy theme, the 
Strategic Energy Technology Plan aims at coordinating 
the different energy-related activities. Another approach 
to foster coordination is through Technology Platforms, 
which are industry-led stakeholder forums recognised 
by the European Commission as key actors in driving in-
novation, knowledge transfer and European competitive-
ness. Some of them are connected to sectors important 
for green industrial policy, especially renewable energy 
and transport. However, the degree to which the activi-
ties of the latter indeed aim at new forms of mobility, as 
opposed to pushing along traditional lines, has yet to 
be determined. Furthermore, the themes of energy effi-
ciency and water seem to be under-represented so far. 
15 European Commission, op. cit. To support member states and re-
gions, the EU has started a smart specialisation platform; see http://
s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home.
No t e : RPA: relative patent activity; RXA: relative export advantage.
* Excluding intra-EU trade.
Sou rces : UN COMTRADE, PATSTAT, calculations by Fraunhofer ISI.
Table 1
Shares and specialisation of EU27 in green 
technology patents and exports
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Successful coordination among actors and stakeholders 
requires that the coordination activities are not captured 
by vested interests and that they remain open to new-
comers. The review of existing EIPs by an independent 
expert group names additional challenges, such as the 
divergence of views among the different Directorates of 
the Commission, the need to bring in more new actors, 
including more SMEs, and the need for a stronger focus 
on systemic change.16
A crucial element of industrial policy is stimulation of the 
demand side. One of the most frequently mentioned in-
struments is public procurement, which has also been a 
prominent factor in traditional mission-oriented projects. 
However, the diversity of user groups and the magnitude 
of investments necessary for a green economy make ad-
ditional demand-side instruments necessary.17 One of 
the specificities of green industrial policy is that environ-
mental policy is part of its rationale. Implementing envi-
ronmental policy, however, not only aims at environmental 
targets but at the same time translates into a demand pull 
for green technologies. The EU has set various targets for 
different environmental topics. The energy targets of the 
EU 2030 energy strategy, which are well known, call for a 
40 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions compared 
to 1990 levels, at least a 27 per cent share of renewables 
in energy consumption and a 30 per cent improvement 
in energy efficiency (compared to business-as-usual pro-
jections). However, there is currently no target for mate-
rial use and resource efficiency. Furthermore, the latest 
European Environmental Agency report on the State of 
the Environment underlines that in various environmental 
fields, the EU is not or only partially on track to reach the 
targets.18 This lack of stringency also indicates that envi-
ronmental policy has not been used to its full potential as 
demand-oriented industrial policy.
However, lack of stringency in some environmental policy 
areas is not the only problem on the demand side of green 
industrial policy. The fragmentation of policy arenas, e.g. 
supply side and environmental policy, with different DGs 
being responsible for policy implementation, has led to 
the effect that the priorities within each arena are some-
times developed without taking the other sides sufficient-
16 E. Aho , S. Schwaag  Se rge r, W. Mön i g , P. W i l s on , C. Ga r-
mend i a , M. S t e i nbe rg , P. Sw i eboda : Outriders for European 
Competitiveness: European Innovation Partnerships (EIPs) as a Tool 
for Systemic Change, Report of the Independent Expert Group, Lux-
embourg 2014, Publications Office of the European Union.
17 D.C. Mowe r y, R.R. Ne l son , B. Ma r t i n : Technology policy and 
global warming: Why new policy models are needed (or why putting 
new wine in old bottles won’t work), in: Research Policy, Vol. 39, No. 8, 
2010, pp. 1011-1023.
18 European Environmental Agency: The European Environment. State 
and Outlook 2015.
ly into consideration. Thus, environmental policy tends to 
emphasise the need to reduce environmental pressure 
as quickly as possible. Green policies on the supply side 
tend to concentrate on topics for which a technological 
push seems possible or for which specific actor struc-
tures imply opportunities. It is one of the major challenges 
of green industrial policy to improve the coordination in 
this area.
The need for better coordination of the demand and sup-
ply sides is also taken up by the European Eco-Innovation 
Action Plan, which forms the most elaborate strategy for 
a European green industrial policy so far. It addresses al-
most the complete range of instruments and policy do-
mains which are discussed with regard to industrial poli-
cy. The following actions are part of the EU EcoAP:
• environmental policy and legislation (Action 1)
• demonstration projects and partnering (Action 2)
• new standards boosting eco-innovation (Action 3)
• financial instruments and support services for SMEs 
(Action 4)
• international cooperation (Action 5)
• development of emerging skills and jobs and related 
training (Action 6)
• European Innovation Partnerships (Action 7).
 
Multi-level governance and the need for impact  
assessment
The EcoAP explicitly calls for activities by the member 
states. This reflects the importance of national interests in 
designing green industrial policies. First, there are differ-
ent views among member states about the future direc-
tion of green strategies. Most obvious is the case of nu-
clear power, which is seen as an environmental problem 
to be phased out as quickly as possible in some member 
states and as a legitimate technology for reducing CO2 
emissions in others. Green industrial policy at the Euro-
pean level is unable to resolve such contradictory views. 
Consequently, it will focus more on fields in which the dif-
ferences among the member states are less dramatic, 
leaving the highly controversial matters to the national 
level.
Another reason for emphasising member states’ activities 
is that the economic costs and benefits of green industrial 
policies differ among member states. Green industrial 
policy is a policy arena in which national governments will 
push the green strategies which benefit their constituen-
cies in their home countries. It will always be a challenge 
to align green industrial policy among the different gov-
ernment levels. Given the high level of economic interest, 
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such a comprehensive and coordinated approach. How-
ever, there are various challenges which have to be met in 
order to make green industrial policy a European success 
story:
• In the context of green industrial policy, environmental 
policy also acts as a demand-oriented industrial policy. 
The EU is only partially on track to reach its environ-
mental goals. Increasing the stringency of environmen-
tal policy will also increase the demand pull for innova-
tive solutions.
• It is important to coordinate the many different activi-
ties at the EU level and avoid sending contradictory 
signals. Overcoming the fragmentation of policies, in 
particular between supply- and demand-oriented (en-
vironmental) policies, will remain an important aspect 
of improving the policy process.
performing impact assessments of the economic impacts 
of green policies becomes a strategic prerequisite of Eu-
ropean activities in green industrial policy. However, it is 
not only the EU’s comparative advantages that differ from 
one technology to the other. Whether a member state is 
among the winners or losers of a green industrial policy 
also depends on which specific sectors and technologies 
are included in the policy. Thus, the impact assessments 
must be based on a sound technological foundation, 
which goes beyond the standard procedure of impact as-
sessment and the use of top-down economic modelling 
instruments alone. Instead, a combination of bottom-up 
tools, qualitative analysis of competitiveness in order to 
derive export scenarios, and macroeconomic models is 
necessary, such as that which was implemented in the 
analysis of the impacts of renewable energy policies in 
Europe for DG Energy (see Figure 3).19
 
Conclusion
There has been renewed interest in industrial policy lately. 
Green industrial policy aims at contributing to reaching 
environmental goals as well as fostering prospects for in-
creased economic growth. The specific rationales for a 
green industrial policy support a policy orientation which 
also puts an emphasis on selective industrial policies. 
However, in order to be implemented successfully, such 
policies require the coordination of government policy 
with business strategies and the substitution of smart in-
strument designs for policies which lead to unsatisfactory 
results. Another challenge is that green industrial policy 
must foster diversity in technological solutions to prevent 
lock-in into too few technologies. Strategic intelligence 
is needed with regard to markets and cost development, 
factors relevant for building a lead market and lead sup-
plier position, monitoring and evaluation of policies, and 
analysis of the impacts of the policies.
An analysis of comparative advantages indicates that 
green technologies offer considerable potential for a suc-
cess story. However, the analysis also indicates that stra-
tegic positioning should differ with regard to the various 
technology classes. There is no “one size fits all” strategy, 
and smart selection and tailoring of policies to technology 
classes is necessary.
EU policy documents and many of its activities, among 
them the EcoAP, indicate that the EU is moving towards 
19 V. Duscha , M. Ragw i t z , B. B re i t s chop f , W. Schade , R. Wa l z , 
M. P f a f f , E. d e  V i s se r, G. Resch , C. Na t han i , P. Zagamé , A. 
Fougey ro l l a s , B. Bo i t i e r : Employment and growth effects of sus-
tainable energies in the European Union, FINAL REPORT, Contract 
No. ENER/C1/428-2012, Karlsruhe, June 2014.
Figure 3
Sectoral employment effects of increasing 
renewable energy use, 2021-30
No te : Average EU-level sectoral employment effects of increasing re-
newable energy demand to 30 or 35 per cent of total energy demand in 
Europe in 2030 under two energy policy scenarios: the Strengthened Na-
tional Policies (SNP) scenario, wherein each country uses national sup-
port schemes to meet its own target, and the quota (QUO) scenario, in 
which an EU-wide harmonised support scheme for the electricity sector 
is assumed.
Sou rce : V. Duscha , M. Ragw i t z , B. B re i t s chop f , W. Schade , R. 
Wa l z , M. P f a f f , E. d e  V i s se r, G. Resch , C. Na t han i , P. Zagamé , 
A. Fougey ro l l a s , B. Bo i t i e r : Employment and growth effects of sus-
tainable energies in the European Union, FINAL REPORT, Contract No. 
ENER/C1/428-2012, Karlsruhe, June 2014.
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China’s history since then has been well documented. By 
the late 1980s, the entire 166 kilometre route along the 
Pearl River Delta, from Guangzhou to Hong Kong, was 
lined with factories on both sides. Shenzhen’s popula-
tion of 20,000 in 1979 had grown to ten million 20 years 
later. Deng had wished to bring prosperity to poor Chi-
nese citizens. Explaining his embrace of markets to do 
so, the communist leader famously said, “It does not mat-
ter whether a cat is black or white, so long as it catches 
mice.” Deng also noted that some parts of China would 
get rich first, but the challenge in the post-Deng era has 
been to raise the wealth of the whole of this vast country. 
The Chinese economy is now the fastest growing in the 
world. Its rise followed that of Japan and the so-called 
Four Little Dragons of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. The post-war world which was dominat-
ed by the United States and Western Europe is seeing a 
gradual rebalancing of economic power towards the east. 
In 2001 the head of Global Economics Research at Gold-
man Sachs, Jim O’Neill, coined the acronym “BRICs” to 
describe Brazil, Russia, India and China and their growing 
importance in the world economy. O’Neill has since spo-
Back in 1978, Communist China had a problem. Shenz-
hen, in Guangdong province, was less than 32 kilometres 
from Hong Kong. China, a poor country, was losing tens 
of thousands of its brightest and best to its non-commu-
nist island neighbour. This problem was not new. Com-
munist East Germany had, after all, built a wall in Berlin to 
prevent the loss of its population to the West. But China’s 
new leader, Deng Xiaoping, took a different approach. 
Rather than more fencing and border controls, Deng be-
lieved that a better idea would be to improve the economy 
of Guangdong so that young people did not wish to flee in 
the first place.
Deng, like Mao Zedong before him, was a communist. But 
unlike Mao, Deng believed that interaction was needed 
between the market and the state if China was to pros-
per. So in the spring of 1978, China set about creating an 
export processing zone in Bao’an county, in Guangdong 
province, where materials could be brought from abroad 
to be manufactured by Chinese labourers and then ex-
ported without tariffs or other restrictions. Within a few 
months, what was to become the Shenzhen Special Eco-
nomic Zone was established.
Tim Page
A European Industrial Policy for the New Global Economy
• The strategic positioning is likely to differ from technol-
ogy to technology. Thus, strategic intelligence must be 
provided on a specific level, too. More strategic intelli-
gence is necessary to avoid policy support being cap-
tured by vested interests and in order to concentrate 
efforts on supporting systemic change.
• European green industrial policy will always be caught 
between the diverging interests of member states. 
Thus, the need for coordination of the different govern-
ment levels will continue. Impact assessments in order 
to demonstrate that green industrial policy supports the 
economic interests of member states will be a prereq-
uisite for EU activities. Given the technology-specific 
level to which green industrial policy has to be tuned, 
this requires linking technology-specific analyses with 
qualitative competitiveness analyses and economic 
modelling.
The debate about green industrial policies focuses on the 
European and national levels. However, value chains are 
becoming increasingly globalised. Smart specialisation 
and the adaptation of policies to specific circumstances 
are one strategy to cope with this.
Another option, which needs further exploration, is a trans-
national approach to industrial policy. This would require 
strategic positioning along international value chains and co-
ordination of industrial policies among the EU and non-EU 
countries affected. Green industrial policy may be particu-
larly suited for such an approach, because it focuses not just 
on economic interests but also on tackling global challenges.
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on the quality of those jobs. Deregulation became part of 
the policy mix, and income inequalities, poverty and ex-
clusion began to rise.
Then, in September 2008, the global financial services 
company Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. The 
world entered its most serious downturn since the Great 
Depression. Economies like that of the UK, which were 
overexposed to the financial services sector, were hit par-
ticularly hard. The downturn caused great pain, in the UK, 
in Europe and across the world. If it had one silver lining, 
at least in the UK, it changed the terms of the economic 
debate. Industrial policy, for so long rejected by policy 
makers, was back in fashion.
 
An industrial strategy for Europe
So in 2015, a year before China is due to become the 
world’s largest economy, according to the OECD, where 
should the EU go next? How do we rebuild the European 
economy after the downturn, while also responding to 
the shift in global economic power? Trade unions believe 
we need a robust industrial strategy as part of a new eco-
nomic model which values the role of the social partners.
This strategy must recognise the importance of exports 
– especially to the growing Chinese market, with its rising 
middle class and increasing taste for consumer goods. 
There are some who think the rise of China will spell the 
end of major manufacturing sectors in Europe. They could 
not be more mistaken. Of course, China has economies of 
scale. It can easily beat Europe in the production of low-
skill, low-value goods, and Europe should not try to com-
pete on those terms. China also wishes to move up the 
value chain, so the coming years will not be easy for the 
West. But China cannot produce everything. Interviewed 
for the TUC report “The Way of the Dragon”, the Minister 
for Manpower and former trade union leader from Sin-
gapore, Lim Swee Say, said, “for any economy not able 
to compete with China, China will be a big threat. Prob-
ably the biggest threat. But for any economy that’s able 
to compete with China, then China will be probably one of 
the biggest opportunities.”1 Moreover, not only will China 
want to buy Western goods, but we know very precisely 
which goods it will want to buy, because China sets out 
its strategy in a five-year plan. The 12th Five-Year Plan, 
published in March 2011, identified seven strategic future 
industrial sectors. The Chinese government has encour-
aged foreign business participation in the development 
of these sectors. This is a huge opportunity for European 
1 The Way of the Dragon, TUC, 2014, p. 14.
ken of the MINTs – Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Tur-
key – to describe another group of emerging economies. 
The message is clear. The world is changing fast. Europe 
needs to respond.
 
Margaret Thatcher and the neo-liberal revolution
Before considering that response, however, let us delve 
once more into late twentieth century history.
In May 1979, a year after the Deng era began in China, the 
UK also embarked on a new economic journey. Margaret 
Thatcher, the incoming Prime Minister, rejected the so-
called Keynesian consensus, which had been supported 
by centre-left and centre-right British governments since 
the end of the Second World War. In its place came neo-
liberalism, which minimised the role of the state, rejecting 
the role of government in shaping an industrial policy. It 
also sought to weaken trade unions. An ideological soul-
mate of Mrs Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, became US Presi-
dent the following year.
During the 1980s, the UK saw a major period of deindus-
trialisation. Nearly one in four of all manufacturing jobs 
disappeared within Mrs Thatcher’s first term of office. 
Privatisations and an economic policy geared towards a 
housing boom followed.
The neo-liberal consensus took hold. The 1997 Labour 
Government of Tony Blair introduced minimum standards 
at work, including a national minimum wage. These were 
important achievements for which the Trades Union Con-
gress (TUC) campaigned hard. But there was no funda-
mental shift in the dynamics of capitalism. Blair set out to 
end child and pensioner poverty, but did not seek to ad-
dress inequality. Manufacturing continued to shrink while 
the financial services industry of the City of London went 
from strength to strength. Few questioned this danger-
ously lopsided economy.
Western European countries did not fully embrace neo-
liberalism in the way that the Anglo Saxon economies 
did, but they nevertheless moved further towards the free 
market philosophy. At the turn of the millennium, the Euro-
pean Union adopted the Lisbon Strategy, which sought to 
make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social co-
hesion” by 2010. This was strongly supported by Euro-
pean trade unions, but as the BRICs assumed a greater 
role in the world economy and former Eastern European 
countries joined the EU, focus switched to the need for a 
high number of European jobs, with much less emphasis 
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fears about employment by targeting “employment-inten-
sive, high-technology, and new technology industries and 
... modern service industries, especially those that are in-
formation, knowledge and employment intensive”.4 There 
will never be an exact match between desirable industries 
and desirable jobs, but where possible, a modern indus-
trial strategy should be employment-specific, targeting 
industries which could be export-rich as well as sectors 
that deliver high quality, well-paying jobs for working peo-
ple.
 
The greening of the economy
The greening of the economy has often been described 
as the “next big thing” after the development of the In-
ternet. Mazzucato argues that Europe, the US and China 
dominated global new investment in renewable energy 
between 2004 and 2011, with Germany leading this in-
vestment in Europe.5 This contrasts with the UK’s stop-
start approach to green initiatives: the outgoing govern-
ment’s 2010 pledge to be the “greenest government ever” 
actually saw a cut in spending, leading to the scaling back 
of green technologies.
It is clear that government must drive the green revolution. 
The private sector will not rise to this task, and if govern-
ment does not step in, European countries risk once again 
being left behind. One interviewee told “The Way of the 
Dragon” that the scale of investments that China is mak-
ing in the seven strategic industries of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan is on a par with the investments that the US made 
in the 1950s in the computer age – the very foundations 
of computer science and the internet that were planted 
in the 1950s in the US. Those comparable sums of hu-
man efforts in finance and research are now taking place 
in China on the technologies of the future and they are not 
being strategically matched by any western economy.
 
Europe’s vital democratic strength
It is easy to become excited about the achievements of 
China over the last thirty years. While those achievements 
have been considerable, let us pause for one moment. 
China is not a democracy in the sense that the West un-
derstands the word. This does not mean its government 
can do whatever it wishes – life is never that simple – but 
it nevertheless proceeds in a way that would not fit the 
values of Europe. China has achieved what it has because 
4 H. Angang , op. cit., p. 137.
5 M. Mazzuca t o : The Entrepreneurial State, London 2013, Anthem 
Press.
companies that should not be lost. A 13th Five-Year Plan 
will follow next year, along with more possibilities.
China also invites us to rethink the relationship between 
state and market in a modern democracy. Deng Xiaop-
ing threw out China’s hard-wired belief that the state was 
infallible. Should the West do the same with markets? The 
dynamism of markets must be recognised and protected, 
of course, but it was a belief in the infallible market that 
led the UK to reject its previous industrial strategy, losing 
much of its manufacturing base in the process. Dr Hu An-
gang, the respected Chinese economist, sets out a very 
specific blueprint, including goals for economic growth, 
structural reform, common prosperity, education, science 
and technology, sustainable development, social harmo-
ny, and democracy and the rule of law.2 While the advis-
ability of strict targets is debateable, the former Deputy 
Prime Minister, Michael Heseltine, called on the UK gov-
ernment to “produce an overarching and long-term Na-
tional Growth Strategy and its vision for wealth creation, 
with concrete commitments against which it can be held 
to account.”3 This envisages the government shaping the 
market, not the other way around.
Europe must increase its spending on research and de-
velopment as a matter of urgency. South Korea spends 
five times as much on R&D as most European countries, 
whilst also having the world’s fastest Internet bandwidth. 
Half of the total number of employees at Tencent Inc, Chi-
na’s largest Internet service portal, work in research and 
development. As both countries are still catching up with 
the West, Europe can withstand this difference for now. In 
the longer term, however, such a disparity is unsustain-
able. In the UK, the Secretary of State for Business in the 
last government, Vince Cable, called for a doubling of in-
novation spending. Over time, such an increase is neces-
sary. It remains to be seen whether the new UK govern-
ment recognises the urgency.
 
Employment creation
Industrial strategy must embrace employment creation. 
For a person of working age, a good job is a cornerstone 
to a good life. It is the best defence against poverty. Yet in 
the UK, it is assumed that the market will provide the nec-
essary jobs. This assumption has clearly been shown to 
be false. As it moves from the age of the “iron rice bowl” 
to an open market economy, China responds to genuine 
2 H. Angang : China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower, Brookings 
Institute Press, 2011.
3 M. Heseltine: No Stone Unturned in Pursuit of Growth, BIS, October 
2012, p. 203.
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in Germany. The study also finds that German subsidi-
aries with trade union recognition exhibit above-average 
productivity.
Sadly, the new Conservative government in the UK wants 
to go in the opposite direction. Rather than embrace trade 
unions as partners, the Business Secretary, Sajid Javid, 
has indicated that an early priority of the government will 
be to make legal strikes more difficult. In order to be legal, 
50 per cent of those entitled to vote must take part in the 
ballot. In public services such as health and education, 
40 per cent of those entitled to vote must be in favour of 
strike action for such action to be possible. Strikes are, of 
course, a last resort, but the right to strike is a hallmark of 
a democratic society. The government would do better to 
focus its efforts on genuinely supporting good industrial 
relations.
 
A strong Europe
Finally, a European industrial policy requires a strong Eu-
rope. The challenges facing our continent are great, but 
so are the opportunities for Europe to move out of the 
crisis and compete on the world stage with the growing 
power of China and India. Following the UK election, there 
will be a referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU by 
2017. Trade unions, along with the majority of businesses, 
will be campaigning hard for the UK to remain central to 
the European Union. Anything else would spell disaster 
for our industries.
 
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is no law of economics to say that 
Europe cannot succeed in the 21st  century. Our success 
simply depends on how we respond to new challenges. 
For example, Singapore operates on the principle that 
where other countries can be cheaper, Singapore has to 
be better. If other countries are better, Singapore has to 
be cheaper.
Europe clearly cannot be cheaper at our stage of eco-
nomic development. We can only be better. That means 
higher quality skills, more research and development, 
and greater investment in infrastructure and in future 
technologies. It means identifying those niche industries 
where we have world-class companies and developing 
what the rest of the world wants to buy. It also means 
including all of our citizens, with managers and trade un-
ions working together to build strong, successful and fair 
workplaces.
of a top-down approach to economic development that 
would be incompatible with the European tradition. Eu-
rope must meet the challenge of China on its own terms, 
and from the bottom-up.
Part of Europe’s democratic heritage is the role and im-
portance of free trade unions. The All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is an important body in China, 
acting as a conduit for discussions in the workplace and 
giving a workers’ perspective to change. But the ACFTU 
is not a free trade union and so, again, it cannot be part 
of a role model for Europe. As readers would expect, the 
TUC supports an active and vibrant trade union move-
ment and, in our view, that union voice should be heard 
as companies make important decisions about their fu-
ture. Europe’s strongest economy, Germany, is a social 
market economy which values the opinions of the work-
force as it does those of employers.6 Central to this is the 
concept of “co-determination”, which allows a workers’ 
voice through Works Councils and Supervisory Boards. 
Martin Rosik, Human Resources Manager at Volkswagen 
in Wolfsburg, states:
From my point of view co-determination does not 
make it more difficult to take important decisions, but 
it depends on the way this kind of influence is used by 
the labour representatives and the company. There is 
a big common sense that competitiveness and labour 
welfare are directly linked to each other.7
A wealth of evidence shows that high-performance 
workplaces, which include a strong workers’ voice, en-
joy higher productivity and profitability. For example, 
Tuselmann et al. studied worker representation, em-
ployee participation and employment relations in Ger-
man subsidiaries in the UK and their associated impact 
on firm performance.8 They found that German subsidi-
aries are more likely than their US counterparts to use 
participative systems that afford independent worker 
structures, which take the form of trade unions in the UK, 
a role in the decision-making in the introduction and op-
eration of comprehensive direct employee participation 
schemes. Tuselmann et al. argue that this is because a 
majority of German multinational companies use a Ger-
man works council model, which alongside sectoral col-
lective bargaining, promotes trust, cooperation and long-
term perspective in management-works council relations 
6 The social market model is discussed at length in German Lessons, 
TUC, 2011.
7 Democracy in the workplace, TUC, 2014, pp. 27-28.
8 H.-J. Tuse lmann , F. McDona l d , A. He i s e , M. A l l e n , S. Vo -
ronkova : Employee Relations in Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries: Ger-
man Multinational Companies in the UK, Basingstoke 2007, Palgrave 
Macmillan.
